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ABSTRACT
We show that the e⁄ects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between
adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by ￿rms. We develop a model in
which ￿rms post job o⁄ers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search
costs to ￿nd jobs. In this model, micro elasticities are smaller than macro elasticities
because they do not account for adjustment costs and ￿rm responses. We present
evidence supporting three predictions of the model by analyzing bunching at kinks
using the universe of tax records in Denmark. First, larger kinks generate larger taxable
income elasticities because they are more likely to overcome search costs. Second, kinks
that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities because they induce
changes in hours constraints. Third, ￿rms tailor job o⁄ers to match workers￿aggregate
tax preferences in equilibrium. Calibrating our model to match these empirical ￿ndings,
we obtain a lower bound on the intensive-margin macro elasticity of 0:34, an order of
magnitude larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods
for wage earners in our data.
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The vast theoretical and empirical literature on taxation and labor supply generally assumes that
workers can freely choose jobs that suit their preferences. This paper shows that the e⁄ect of
taxes on labor supply is shaped by two factors that limit workers￿ability to make optimal choices:
adjustment costs and hours constraints endogenously set by ￿rms. We present quasi-experimental
evidence showing that these forces attenuate microeconometric estimates of labor supply elasticities
and develop a method of recovering macro elasticities from micro estimates.
To structure our empirical analysis, we develop an model of intensive-margin labor supply with
job search costs and endogenous hours constraints. We model hours constraints by assuming that
each ￿rm requires its employees to work a ￿xed number of hours because of an ex ante commitment
to a production technology.1 Workers draw o⁄ers from the aggregate distribution of hours o⁄ered
by ￿rms. Workers can search for jobs that require hours closer to their unconstrained optimum
by paying search costs. In equilibrium, the number of jobs posted by ￿rms at each level of hours
equals the number of workers who select those hours after the search process is complete. The
aggregate distribution of workers￿preferences therefore determines the hours constraints imposed
by ￿rms in equilibrium.2 However, most individuals do not work their unconstrained optimal
number of hours because of search costs.
Our model produces a divergence between micro and macro labor supply elasticities. We de￿ne
the macro elasticity as the e⁄ect of variation in taxes across economies on average hours of work.
We show that the macro elasticity always equals the ￿structural￿ labor supply elasticity ", the
parameter of individuals￿utility functions that determines elasticities absent frictions. In contrast,
micro elasticities ￿de￿ned as the e⁄ect of tax changes or kinks in non-linear tax systems that a⁄ect
subgroups of workers ￿are attenuated relative to " because of search costs and hours constraints.
The model generates three testable predictions about how search costs and hours constraints
a⁄ect the labor supply (or taxable income) elasticities observed in micro studies. First, the
observed elasticity increases with the size of the tax variation from which the estimate is identi￿ed.
Intuitively, large tax changes prompt more individuals to pay search costs and ￿nd a new job.
1We focus on hours constraints in our model for simplicity, but they should be interpreted more broadly as
technological constraints on job characteristics (e.g. training, e⁄ort, bene￿t packages). When jobs have multiple
characteristics beyond hours, the key predictions of our model apply to the taxable income elasticity rather than the
hours elasticity.
2This endogenous determination of wage-hours o⁄ers is the key innovation in this model relative to the few existing
models of hours constraints, in which ￿rms￿technologies fully determine the distribution of wage-hours packages (e.g.
Rosen 1976).
1Analogously, larger kinks induce more individuals to pay search costs to ￿nd a job that places
them at the kink. Second, the observed elasticity increases with the number of workers a⁄ected
by a tax change or kink. Changes in taxes induce changes in labor supply not just by making
individuals search for di⁄erent jobs, but also by changing the distribution of hours o⁄ered by
￿rms in equilibrium. Because changes in taxes that a⁄ect a larger group of individuals induce
larger changes in hours constraints, they generate larger observed elasticities. Furthermore, tax
changes may a⁄ect even the labor supply of workers whose personal tax incentives are unchanged
by distorting their coworkers￿incentives and inducing changes in hours constraints. Finally, the
model predicts a correlation between ￿rm responses and individual responses to taxes. Because
￿rms cater to workers￿aggregate tax preferences when making job o⁄ers, one should observe larger
distortions in the equilibrium distribution of job o⁄ers in sectors or occupations where workers
themselves exhibit larger tax elasticities.
We test these three predictions using a matched employer-employee panel of the population in
Denmark between 1994 and 2001. This dataset combines administrative records on earnings and
taxable income, demographic characteristics, and employment characteristics such as occupation
and tenure. There are two sources of tax variation in the data: tax reforms across years, which
produce variation in marginal net-of-tax wage rates of 10% or less, and changes in tax rates across
tax brackets within a year, which generate variation in net-of-tax wages of up to 35%. We focus
primarily on the cross-bracket variation in taxes rates because it is larger and applies to large
subgroups of the population, permitting coordinated responses. In particular, we estimate taxable
income elasticities by measuring the amount of bunching in earnings at kink points, as in Saez
(2009).3
Consistent with the ￿rst prediction, the elasticities implied by the amount of bunching at large
kinks are signi￿cantly larger than those implied by the amount of bunching at smaller kinks. There
is substantial, visually evident excess mass in the wage earnings distribution around the cuto⁄ for
the top income tax bracket in Denmark, at which the net-of-tax wage rate falls by approximately
30%. There is little excess mass at kinks where the net-of-tax wage falls by 10%, and no excess
mass at kinks that generate variation in net-of-tax wages smaller than 10%. Similarly, we ￿nd no
changes in earnings around the small tax reforms that change net-of-tax wages by less than 10%.
The observed elasticities at the largest kinks are 3-5 times those generated by smaller kinks and
3Following the modern public ￿nance literature reviewed in Saez et al. (2009), we proxy for ￿labor supply￿using
taxable income. We discuss the implications of measuring taxable income elasticities instead of hours elasticities
below.
2tax reforms across a broad range of demographic groups, occupations, and years. Using a series
of auxiliary tests, we show that the di⁄erences in observed elasticities are driven by di⁄erences in
the size of the tax changes rather than heterogeneity in structural elasticities by income levels or
tax rates.
To test the second prediction, we exploit heterogeneity in deductions across workers. In Den-
mark, 60% of wage earners have zero deductions. These workers reach the top tax bracket when
their wage earnings exceeds the top tax cuto⁄ for taxable income, which we term the ￿statutory￿
top tax cuto⁄. Workers with large deductions or non-wage income, however, reach the top tax
cuto⁄ at di⁄erent levels of wage earnings and thus have less common tax incentives. We ￿rst
demonstrate that ￿rms cater to the tax incentives of the most common workers. In particular,
the mode of occupation-level wage earnings distributions has an excess propensity to be located
near the statutory top tax cuto⁄.4 Importantly, the wage earnings distribution even for workers
who have substantial deductions or non-wage income exhibits excess mass at the statutory top tax
cuto⁄. Because these workers do not face any change in marginal tax rates at the statutory cuto⁄,
this ￿nding constitutes direct evidence that ￿rms tailor wage-hours o⁄ers to the tax preferences
of the majority of workers who have small deductions. We label this ￿rm-driven response to tax
incentives ￿￿rm bunching.￿
Although ￿rm bunching is an important source of behavioral responses to the tax system, some
of the bunching at kinks is driven by individual workers searching for jobs that place them near the
top tax kink. To isolate and measure such ￿individual bunching,￿we exploit a cap on tax-deductible
pension contributions, which is on average DKr 33,000 in the years we study. Approximately 3% of
workers make pension contributions up to this amount and therefore cross into the highest income
tax bracket when they earn DKr 33,000 more than the statutory top tax cuto⁄. We ￿nd that this
pension-driven kink induces excess mass in the distribution of wage earnings at DKr 33,000 above
the top tax cuto⁄. This excess mass appears to be driven solely by individual job search, as there is
no excess mass at the pension-driven kink for workers with small deductions. Hence, ￿rms respond
only to tax incentives that a⁄ect a large group of workers, as the model predicts. Because of ￿rm
bunching, workers with common tax preferences (small deductions) have a higher propensity to
bunch at the top tax kink than those with uncommon tax preferences (large deductions).
We test the third prediction by estimating the correlation between individual and ￿rm bunching
4We focus on wage earnings distributions at the occupation level because most workers￿wages are set through
collective bargains at the occupation level in Denmark.
3across occupations. We ￿nd that ￿rms are more likely to bunch workers at the statutory kink
in occupations where workers exhibit more individual bunching in wage earnings at the pension-
driven kink. Although this result cannot be interpreted as a causal e⁄ect because the variation
in the degree of individual bunching is not exogenous, it is consistent with the prediction that
￿rms cater to workers￿tax preferences in equilibrium. Further supporting the importance of ￿rm
responses, we ￿nd that some of the heterogeneity in elasticities across demographic groups is driven
by occupational choice. For instance, reweighting men￿ s occupations to match those of women￿ s
eliminates 50% of the gap in observed elasticities between men and women.
All of the results above are obtained for wage earners. We analyze self-employed individuals
separately. As the self-employed do not face signi￿cant adjustment costs or hours constraints, one
would expect that none of our three predictions should hold for this subgroup. Indeed, we ￿nd that
the self-employed exhibit sharp bunching at both small and large kinks, show no evidence of ￿￿rm
bunching￿at the statutory kink, and are equally likely to bunch irrespective of their deductions.
These placebo tests support our hypothesis that search costs and hours constraints are the key
factors that attenuate micro elasticity estimates for wage earners.
Using the reduced-form empirical evidence described above, we calibrate our model to estimate
the structural elasticity ". As the model has many structural primitives, we develop a method
of placing a lower bound on " without point identifying the remaining parameters. The intuition
underlying the bound is that the utility losses agents su⁄er by deviating from their optimal hours
choices are inversely related to " (Chetty 2009a). A small " generates signi￿cant bunching at both
small and large kinks because the utility gains from bunching exceed search costs. Hence, for a
given level of frictions, " must exceed a lower bound in order to generate the substantial di⁄erence
between the elasticities observed at small and large kinks in the data. Implementing this partial
identi￿cation approach by parametrizing our model, we obtain a lower bound on the structural (or
macro) elasticity of " ￿ 0:34.
Micro elasticity estimates understate " by an order of magnitude in our data. Even at the
largest kink where net-of-tax wages fall by 30%, the elasticity implied by the observed amount of
bunching (ignoring frictions) is less than 0:02. The observed elasticity is substantially attenuated
because the utility loss from ignoring the 30% kink (and optimizing as if there were no increase in
tax rates) is less than 2% of consumption if " = 0:34. Given plausible frictions, the fact that there
is any bunching at all implies that the underlying structural elasticity must be signi￿cantly larger
than 0.02. Micro estimates are attenuated by frictions because they are identi￿ed from individuals￿
4responses to changes in tax rates or kinks after obtaining a job near their optimum. In contrast,
macro variation in tax rates across countries changes the jobs individuals search for and the jobs
o⁄ered by ￿rms to begin with, producing larger elasticities.
Our results help explain the longstanding puzzle of why macro studies ￿nd much larger elas-
ticities than microeconometric studies. Micro studies have found very small intensive-margin
elasticities for all except top income earners (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999, Saez et al. 2009). For
instance, Chetty (2009a) reports a mean elasticity estimate of 0.12 based on a meta-analysis of 12
recent studies. In a microeconometric study that uses the same Danish microdata as we do here,
Kleven and Schultz (2010) estimate an elasticity of zero by studying tax reforms over a twenty year
period. Our elasticity estimates for middle-income wage earners justify calibrating macro models
with larger elasticities than these micro estimates. However, we caution that our ￿ndings do not
provide justi￿cation for the very large elasticities (e.g. " > 1) used in some macro models.
Our explanation for the gap between micro and macro elasticities complements recent work
arguing that macro elasticities are larger because they incorporate both extensive and intensive
margin responses (e.g. Rogerson and Wallenius 2009). While this insight clearly explains part
of the puzzle, much of the di⁄erence in labor supply across countries with di⁄erent tax regimes is
driven by hours worked conditional on employment (Davis and Henrekson 2005). That is, macro
estimates of intensive margin elasticities are much larger than their microeconometric counterparts.
Our analysis explains this divergence between intensive margin elasticities.5
In addition to the literature on micro vs. macro elasticities, our study builds on and contributes
to several other strands of the literature on labor supply. First, previous work has proposed that
adjustment costs and hours constraints a⁄ect labor supply decisions (e.g. Cogan 1981, Altonji and
Paxson 1988, Ham 1982, Dickens and Lundberg 1993). Our contribution is to show how these
factors a⁄ect estimates of intensive-margin labor supply elasticities. Our ￿ndings also support
the hypothesis that the e⁄ects of government policies may operate through coordinated changes in
social norms or institutions rather than individual behavior (e.g. Lindbeck 1995, Alesina, Glaeser
and Sacerdote 2005).
Second, our results contribute to the literature on non-linear budget sets (e.g., Hausman 1981,
Mo¢ tt 1990, MaCurdy, Green, and Parsch 1990), where the lack of bunching at kinks creates
problems in ￿tting models to the data. As noted by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), ￿...for the
5See Chetty (2009a) for a more thorough reconciliation of micro and macro elasticities on both the intensive and
extensive margins.
5vast majority of data sources currently used in the literature, only a trivial number of individuals,
if indeed any at all, report [earnings] at interior kink points.￿ The kinks examined in previous
studies are generally much smaller ￿both in the change in tax rates at the kink and the size of the
group of individuals a⁄ected ￿than the largest kinks studied here. Our calibrated model explains
behavior at kinks of di⁄erent sizes by incorporating adjustment costs and hours constraints into a
non-linear budget set framework.
Third, our analysis relates to recent work on taxable income as a measure of labor supply.
Feldstein (1999) argues that taxable income elasticities are a su¢ cient statistic for tax policy
analysis, but more recent studies argue that it is important to distinguish income shifting from
￿real￿changes in labor supply (Goolsbee 2000, Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, Chetty 2009b). We
show that the bunching we observe is driven by changes in wage earnings rather than tax avoidance
via pension contributions or evasion. However, because our dataset does not contain information
on hours of work, we cannot de￿nitively rule out the possibility that some of the responses we
observe arise from income shifting. Importantly, distinguishing income shifting from hours of work
is not critical for the conclusions we draw here. Although our model focuses on hours choices,
its predictions also apply to an environment with adjustment costs and coordination constraints in
income shifting.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set up the model, de￿ne micro and macro
elasticities formally, and derive the three testable predictions. Section III describes the Danish
data and provides institutional background. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V
calibrates the model to bound the macro elasticity using the evidence. Section VI concludes.
II Search Costs and Hours Constraints in a Labor Supply Model
We make two assumptions to tailor our model to the empirical analysis and calibration. First,
we only consider intensive-margin labor supply choices and do not model labor force participation.
Second, we analyze a static model because our empirical analysis focuses on how search costs
and hours constraints interact in equilibrium rather than on the dynamics of adjustment in labor
supply. We present some results on responses to tax reforms in a two-period extension of the model
in Appendix A, but defer a complete analysis of dynamics with search costs and endogenous hours
constraints to future work.
6II.A Model Setup
We develop a labor supply model in which ￿rms and workers are price-takers in competitive equi-
librium.6
Firms. Firms have one-factor linear production technologies. Each ￿rm employs a single worker
to produce goods sold at a ￿xed price p. Let w(h) denote the hourly wage rate paid to workers
who work h hours in equilibrium. Firm j posts a job that requires hj hours of work at the market
wage rate w(hj). We model hours constraints by assuming that a ￿rm cannot change the hours it
posts after matching with a worker. This assumption captures the intuition that ￿rms sink capital
in a technology that requires a certain amount of labor for production before hiring workers.
Firms choose the hours hj they post to maximize pro￿t:
(1) ￿j = phj ￿ w(hj)hj
Intuitively, ￿rms seek to produce at an hours level where the supply of labor exceeds demand,
allowing them to earn pro￿ts by paying a wage w(hj) < p. Because ￿rms are free to enter the
market at any level of hours hj, pro￿ts are bid to zero, implying that w(hj) = w = p for all hj in
equilibrium. Let the aggregate distribution of hours required by ￿rms be denoted by a cdf G(h).
Workers. Workers, indexed by i, have quasi-linear utility





over a numeraire consumption good c and hours of work h. The heterogeneous taste parameter
￿i > 0, is distributed according to a smooth cdf F(￿i) with full support on a closed interval.
This utility speci￿cation eliminates income e⁄ects and generates a constant wage elasticity of labor
supply " in a frictionless model. We abstract from income e⁄ects because the variation in marginal
tax rates at kinks that we exploit for identi￿cation has little e⁄ect on average tax rates and thus
generates negligible income e⁄ects. We extend the analysis to utility functions that generate
non-constant elasticities in Appendix A.
In addition to wage earnings whi, each worker also has stochastic non-wage income yi s FY
6We analyze a model with competitive equilibrium so that our only departure from standard neoclassical models
is the introduction of frictions. We expect that a model with frictions where wages and hours are determined through
bargaining rather than competitive equilibrium would generate the same three testable predictions.
7whose realization is unknown at the time she chooses hi. To characterize tax changes that a⁄ect
subgroups of the population di⁄erently, assume that there are two types of tax systems, indexed by
s = fNL;Lg.7 Individuals with si = NL face a two-bracket non-linear tax system with marginal
tax rates of ￿1 and ￿2 > ￿1. These workers begin to pay the higher tax rate when their incomes
yi + wihi exceed a threshold K. Individuals with si = L pay a linear tax rate of ￿ on all income.





(1 ￿ ￿1)min(yi + wihi;K) + (1 ￿ ￿2)max(yi + wihi ￿ K;0) if si = NL
(1 ￿ ￿)(yi + wihi) if si = L
A fraction ￿ of workers face the non-linear tax system NL and the remainder (1￿￿) face the linear
tax system L. The tax systems workers face are uncorrelated with their tastes: F(￿ijsi) = F(￿i).
Let worker i￿ s optimal level of hours be denoted by h￿
i = argmaxhi
R







Workers begin their search for a job by drawing an initial o⁄er h0
i from the aggregate o⁄er
distribution G(h). Each worker can either accept this o⁄er or turn it down and search for another
job. A worker who declines her initial o⁄er draw a new o⁄er h0
i from a distribution Ge(h0jh￿
i)
centered around her optimal hours choice h￿
i (so that E[h0jh￿
i] = h￿
i). The worker can obtain a
more precise draw from Ge by exerting search e⁄ort e 2 [0;1]: var(h0
i) = k￿(1￿e). Exerting e units
of search e⁄ort has a monetary cost ￿i(e) for worker i, where ￿i is a weakly increasing function.8
Workers who choose to decline their initial o⁄er choose search e⁄ort e to maximize expected utility
net of search costs,
max
e Eui (ci;hi) ￿ ￿i(e),
and accept a new o⁄er h0
i. This job search process for workers can be viewed as a functional F
that maps an aggregate distribution of hours posted by ￿rms G(h) and wage schedule w(h) to a
new distribution F(G(h);w(h)).
Equilibrium. In equilibrium, the labor market must clear at each hours level h at a wage rate
w = p. Market clearing requires that the distribution of jobs initially posted by ￿rms coincides
with the jobs selected by workers after the job search process is complete, i.e. G(h) = F (G(h);w).9
Because of market forces, the hours constraints imposed by ￿rms in equilibrium are endogenous
7For example, tax systems often treat single and married individuals di⁄erently, in which case the two types in
our model would be de￿ned by marital status.
8The parametric assumption var(h
0
j) = k ￿(1￿e) is made without loss of generality because ￿i(e) is unrestricted.
9We are unable to obtain general analytical results on existence and uniqueness of G(h), but have found that both
of these properties hold for a wide range of parameters using numerical simulations.
8to the aggregate distribution of worker preferences. If many workers prefer to work 40 hours per
week, many ￿rms choose technologies that allow production with 40 hours of labor per week in
equilibrium.
This model, which generates a single wage rate w = p, should be viewed as a representation
of one sector or occupation in the economy. It is straightforward to generate heterogeneous wage
rates by introducing multiple sectors. Suppose there are Q di⁄erent skill types of workers and Q
types of corresponding output goods sold at prices p1;:::;pQ. Workers of type q can only work at
￿rms that produce good q, so there is no interaction across the Q segments of the labor market.
Then each sector has an equilibrium wage rate wq = pq and an equilibrium hours distribution
determined by its workers￿preferences according to the model above.
The following sections characterize the properties of the equilibrium hours distribution G(h),
focusing on the relationship between tax rates and labor supply. For analytical convenience, we
derive the key predictions in a series of special cases. We begin by reviewing the benchmark model
without search frictions, the special case in which ￿i(e) = 0.
II.B Special Case 1: Benchmark Frictionless Model
In the frictionless model, the structural preference parameter " fully determines the e⁄ects of taxes
on labor supply. This is because workers who face no search costs always choose their unconstrained
optimal level of hours h￿
i. For workers with si = L, who face a linear tax ￿, the optimal level of
hours is h￿
i = ￿i ((1 ￿ ￿)w)
". The hours choices of workers who face the non-linear tax system can
be characterized analytically if there is no uncertainty about non-wage income (yi = 0). When




> > > <
> > > :
￿i ((1 ￿ ￿1)w)
" if ￿i < ￿
hK = K
w if ￿i 2 [￿;￿]
￿i ((1 ￿ ￿2)w)
" if ￿i > ￿
where ￿ = hK=((1 ￿ ￿1)w)
" and ￿ = hK=((1 ￿ ￿2)w)
". Workers with moderate disutilities of
labor supply ￿i 2 [￿;￿] bunch at the kink because the net-of-tax wage falls discontinuously at hK,
while workers with low or high disutilities of labor choose hours based on the marginal tax rates in
the relevant bracket.10
10The logic for why a mass of workers bunch at the kink is captured by the following quote from a Danish
construction worker interviewed by the Danish Tax Reform Commission: ￿By the end of November, some of my
colleagues stop working. It does not pay anymore because they have reached the high tax bracket.￿
9Now consider how variation in the linear tax rate ￿ a⁄ects labor supply. When subject to a
higher tax rate, workers of type s = L optimally reduce their work hours by
(5) dlogh = " ￿ dlog(1 ￿ ￿):
This equation shows that the elasticity of hours with respect to the net-of-tax rate (1￿￿) coincides
with the structural parameter " in the frictionless model. We shall therefore refer to " as the
￿structural￿elasticity. Workers of type s = NL, who are una⁄ected by ￿, do not change hours of
work and can be used as a control group in an empirical study. Note that in this one-dimensional
model of labor supply, the hours elasticity coincides with the elasticity of taxable wage income (wh)
with respect to the net-of-tax-rate: " =
dlogwh
dlog(1￿￿). Thus, all the results below apply to both hours
and taxable income elasticities.11
The elasticity " is most commonly estimated using variation in tax rates from tax reforms
(Blundell and MaCurdy 1999, Saez et al. 2009). However, " can also be identi￿ed from cross-
sectional variation in tax rates using non-linear budget set methods (e.g. Hausman 1981). In
particular, the amount of bunching observed at kinks identi￿es " (Saez 2009). Let B = [F(￿) ￿
F(￿)] denote the fraction of type si = NL individuals who choose hi = hK. Under the assumption
that there is no uncertainty about non-wage income (yi = 0 for all i) and the approximation that














where b = B=g(hK) denotes the fraction of workers who bunch at the kink normalized by the
density of the hours distribution at the kink. Intuitively, the fraction of individuals who stop
working at h = hK hours because of the drop in the net-of-tax wage at that point is proportional to
". If workers face uncertainty in unearned income or wage rates, " can be recovered by measuring
the excess mass in a window around the kink and adjusting for the degree of uncertainty, as we
demonstrate in section IV.
An important property of equations (5) and (6) is that the observed elasticity coincides with
11Following Feldstein (1999), the modern public ￿nance literature has emphasized that income taxes distort choices
beyond hours of work, such as training, e⁄ort, and fringe bene￿ts. It is straightforward to incorporate these other
margins into the model by assuming that workers have utility over H dimensions of labor supply (h
1;:::;h
H) and
￿rms post job o⁄ers that specify all H dimensions (h
1;:::;h
H) along with wage rates. In such a model, predictions
1-3 apply with respect to the taxable income elasticity rather than the hours elasticity.
10" irrespective of the magnitude of the change in tax rates or the fraction of workers ￿ a⁄ected by
the tax change.12 This result underlies microeconometric empirical studies of labor supply that
use changes in taxes that a⁄ect subgroups of the population to identify ". We now show that with
search costs and hours constraints, observed elasticities vary with the size and scope of tax changes
and no longer coincide with ".
II.C Special Case 2: Search Costs and Worker Responses
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of search costs on behavioral responses to taxation,
abstracting from changes in the hours constraints set by ￿rms. To isolate worker responses and
obtain analytical results, we specialize the model in three ways. First, we assume that the set
of workers a⁄ected by the tax change has measure zero. When analyzing bunching at kinks, we
assume that the fraction of agents who face the non-linear tax system is ￿ = 0; conversely, when
analyzing tax reforms, we assume ￿ = 1. Under this assumption, the tax change has no impact on
the equilibrium o⁄er distribution G(h) and only a⁄ects the treated workers￿hours through changes
in job search. Second, we consider a search cost function that generates a binary search decision:
workers either retain their initial hours draw h0 or pay a search cost ￿ and choose their optimal
hours deterministically. That is, we assume ￿i(e) = ￿ 8e 2 [0;1], so that workers set e = 1 if they
choose to search. Finally, we assume that there is no uncertainty about non-wage income (yi = 0)
as above so that we can measure elasticities from point masses at kinks.






the thresholds are de￿ned by the equations:
u(ci(h￿
i);h￿








= ￿ with hi > h￿
i (8)




retain their initial o⁄er because the
utility gains from working h￿
i hours instead of h0
i hours are less than the cost of search ￿. After
the search process is complete, there are two types of workers at each ￿rm j: a point mass whose
optimal labor supply h￿
i = hj is exactly that o⁄ered by the ￿rm and a distribution of workers with
optimal hours near but not equal to hj.
Now consider how the mapping from the amount of bunching at kinks to " in (6) is a⁄ected
12We use the term ￿tax change￿to refer both to changes in tax rates over time via reforms and changes in marginal
tax rates at kinks within a given period.






￿ denote the elasticity obtained by applying equation
(6). We shall refer to ^ " as the ￿observed￿elasticity from bunching at the kink. To understand
the connection between ^ " and ", ￿rst recall that in the frictionless model (where ￿ = 0), workers






.13 As a result, the observed elasticity ^ " is smaller than the structural elasticity ".
As the size of the tax change at the kink increases (￿1 falls or ￿2 rises), the set of workers with








Because the equilibrium hours distribution G(h) is not a⁄ected by ￿1 and ￿2 when ￿ = 0, it follows




collapses to hK for agents with ￿i 2 [￿;￿], and ^ " ! ". Intuitively, the e⁄ects of large tax changes
that a⁄ect a measure zero set of workers (￿ = 0) depend purely on workers￿preferences (") because
they make all the treated workers reoptimize without inducing ￿rm responses.
Larger kinks generate larger observed elasticities because the utility costs of ignoring a kink
increase with its size. Figure 1 illustrates this intuition using indi⁄erence curves in consumption-





the budget constraint crosses the indi⁄erence curve that yields utility ￿ units less than the maximal
utility U￿. Now suppose ￿2 increases, moving the upper budget segment from the solid line to the
dashed line. Then the upper bound hi decreases, which in turn increases ^ ". This is because the
utility loss from supplying hours above the kink rises with ￿2, as one earns less for this extra e⁄ort.
These results lead to our ￿rst testable prediction about how search costs a⁄ect the relationship
between taxes and labor supply:
Prediction 1: When workers face search costs, the observed elasticity from bunching rises with
the size of the tax change and converges to " as the size of the tax change grows:
(10) @^ "=@￿2 > 0, @^ "=@￿1 < 0, and lim
(￿2￿￿1)!1
^ " = "
We derive an analogous prediction for observed elasticities from tax reforms in Appendix A.






do not contribute to the point mass at the kink because G(h) is smooth when
￿ = 0. Therefore, among type s = NL workers, the set who draw an initial hours o⁄er h
0
i = K=w has measure zero.
G(h) is smooth in this case because the distribution of tastes F(￿) is smooth and the set of agents who face a smooth
(linear) tax schedule has measure 1.
12Tax reforms generate observed elasticities ^ " =
dlogh
dlog(1￿￿) that di⁄er from "; as the size of the tax
reform grows, ^ " ! ". The intuition for this result is very similar to that for bunching: many
workers will not pay the search cost to ￿nd a job that requires fewer hours following a tax increase,
attenuating ^ ". However, unlike in the case of bunching, observed elasticities from tax reforms need
not always be smaller than ". For example, if workers are close to the edge of their inaction regions
prior to the reform ￿which could in principle occur if there have been a series of small tax increases
in the past ￿then a small tax change could lead to large adjustments, generating ^ " > ". Hence,
observing that elasticities rise with the size of tax reforms is su¢ cient, but not necessary, to infer
that search costs a⁄ect observed elasticities.
Non-Constant Structural Elasticities. If the utility function is not isoelastic, one may observe
an elasticity ^ " that increases with the size of the tax change even without search costs. We can
distinguish search costs from variable structural elasticities by comparing the e⁄ects of several small
tax changes with the e⁄ects of a larger change that spans the smaller changes. In Appendix A,
we show that with an arbitrary utility u(c;l) and tax rates ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3; the amount of bunching
at two smaller kinks is equal to the bunching created at a single larger kink in the frictionless case
(￿ = 0):
B (￿1;￿3) = B (￿1;￿2) + B (￿2;￿3).
This is because the amount of bunching increases linearly with the size of the kink without search
costs, as shown in (6). In contrast, when ￿ > 0,
B (￿1;￿3) > B (￿1;￿2) + B (￿2;￿3):
Intuitively, agents are more likely to pay the ￿xed search cost ￿ to relocate to the bigger kink,
and thus it generates more bunching and a larger observed elasticity than the two smaller kinks
together. A similar result applies to tax reforms: the e⁄ect of two small tax reforms, each starting
from a steady state di⁄ers from the e⁄ect of one large reform only when ￿ > 0. We exploit these
results to show that the di⁄erences in observed elasticities we document in our empirical analysis
are driven by search costs rather than changes in the structural elasticity.
Micro vs. Macro Elasticities. Search costs lead to a divergence between the elasticities observed
from micro studies of tax reforms or bunching and the elasticities relevant for macroeconomic
comparisons. In particular, the structural elasticity " determines the steady-state e⁄ect of variation
13in tax policies across economies on aggregate labor supply even with search costs.14 To see this,
consider two economies with di⁄erent linear tax rates, ￿ and ￿0, for workers with si = L. To
abstract from ￿rm responses to this tax variation, assume that the set of individuals facing the
linear tax has measure zero (￿ = 1); we show that the same result holds with ￿rm responses in the
next subsection. We de￿ne the observed macro elasticity as the e⁄ect of this di⁄erence in tax rates
on hours of work:
b "MAC =
Eloghi(￿0) ￿ Eloghi(￿)
log(1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)




i(￿) = " ￿ (log(1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿))
Workers who retain their original hours draw h0
i have average work hours of
R hi
hi hdG(h). Under a
quadratic approximation to utility, the movement in the inaction region is also determined by ":
@ loghi
@ log(1 ￿ ￿)
=
@ loghi
@ log(1 ￿ ￿)
’ ":
Under the approximation that the o⁄er distribution G(h) is uniform between hi and hi,
Eloghi(￿0) ￿ Eloghi(￿) ’ " ￿ (log(1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿))
It follows that b "MAC ’ ": the macro elasticity approximately equals the structural elasticity re-
gardless of the search cost ￿.
The critical di⁄erence between micro and macro elasticities is that the former are identi￿ed
from a worker￿ s decision to switch jobs ex-post because of tax incentives, whereas the latter are
identi￿ed from di⁄erences in ex-ante job search behavior. Search costs reduce workers￿propensity
to ￿ne tune their labor supply choices by bunching at kinks or responding to tax reforms because
the costs of deviating from optima are second-order. But workers search for jobs with fewer hours
to begin with in an economy with higher tax rates. Consequently, a tax reform or a kink that
changes the marginal rate from ￿1 to ￿0
1 generates a smaller observed elasticity than the same
￿macro￿variation in tax rates of ￿1 vs. ￿0
1 across economies.
14Recovering the structural primitives of preferences is also essential for welfare analysis.
14II.D Special Case 3: Hours Constraints and Firm Responses
We now show how changes in hours constraints set by ￿rms a⁄ect observed responses to tax changes.
To highlight ￿rm responses and obtain analytical results, we consider a di⁄erent special case of the
model. First, we assume ￿ 2 (0;1), so that there is a positive measure of workers a⁄ected by both
tax systems. Second, we assume that at each level of ￿i, a fraction ￿ of workers face no search
costs (￿i(e) = ￿i = 0) and the remaining workers cannot search at all (￿i(e) = ￿i = 1). Finally,
we maintain the assumption above that there is no uncertainty about non-wage income (yi = 0).
In this special case, workers￿search decisions are simple: those with ￿i = 0 set hi = h￿
i and
those with ￿i = 1 set hi = h0
i, their initial hours draw. As a result, the equilibrium distribution
of job o⁄ers G(h) coincides with the distribution of optimal hours choices, G￿(h). The reason is
that the search process F maps a distribution of o⁄ers to F(G) = ￿G￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)G, and hence G￿
is the only ￿xed point of F. Intuitively, workers with ￿i = 0 always choose their optimal hours,
and so the only o⁄er distribution that is a ￿xed point for them is G￿. As any o⁄er distribution is
a ￿xed point for the ￿i = 1 group, G￿ must be the aggregate hours distribution in equilibrium.
This result illustrates that ￿rms cater to workers￿preferences when setting hours constraints in
equilibrium. Taxes therefore a⁄ect labor supply by changing aggregate worker preferences and
inducing shifts in hours constraints.
To see how this mechanism a⁄ects elasticity estimates, consider the observed elasticity from
bunching for the workers who face the non-linear tax (si = NL). Let B￿(￿1;￿2) denote the level of
bunching that one would observe in the frictionless model (￿ = 1) for these workers. With search
costs (￿ < 1), the observed amount of bunching for workers with si = NL is:
B = ￿B￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B￿
The two terms in this expression represent two distinct sources of bunching. The ￿rst term arises
from workers who choose hi = h￿
i = hK because they face no search costs. The second term
arises from the workers who set hi = h0
i = hK because they face in￿nite search costs. Because
the aggregate distribution of hours coincides with the optimal aggregate distribution, a fraction
￿B￿ of the equilibrium job o⁄ers have hours of hK. We label the ￿rst component of bunching
(BI = ￿B￿) ￿individual bunching￿because it arises from individuals￿choices to locate at the kink
via job search.15 We label the second component (BF = (1 ￿ ￿)￿B￿) ￿￿rm bunching￿because it
15A fraction (B
￿)
2 of workers with ￿i = 0 and h
￿
i = hK draw the h
0
i = hK to begin with and are therefore
15arises from workers drawing an initial hours o⁄er that places them at the kink to begin with.
The signature of ￿rm bunching is that it generates bunching even amongst workers who have no
incentive to locate at the kink. Consider workers with si = L, who face a linear tax schedule and
experience no change in marginal tax rates at hK. Because of the interaction of hours constraints
with search costs, these workers also bunch at the kink via the ￿rm bunching channel. These
workers draw h0
i = hK with probability ￿B￿ and are forced to retain that o⁄er if ￿i = 1. The
amount of bunching observed for workers with si = L is therefore BL = (1 ￿ ￿)￿B￿ = BF. This
equivalence between BL and BF is useful empirically because we cannot measure BF directly (as we
do not observe search behavior), but we can measure BL since we do observe workers￿tax schedules.
Intuitively, any bunching among those who do not face a kink must represent ￿rm bunching.







￿ = ￿" + (1 ￿ ￿)￿" < "
The observed elasticity is smaller than the structural elasticity because search costs prevent some
workers who would like to be at the kink from moving there.16 The observed elasticity rises
with the scope of the kink ￿ ￿the fraction of workers in the economy who face the non-linear tax
schedule. When more workers face a change in tax incentives at an earnings level of K, ￿rms are
compelled to o⁄er more jobs in equilibrium at hK hours to cater to aggregate preferences. Thus
a kink that a⁄ects more workers generates more ￿rm bunching (higher BF) and thereby leads to
more total bunching and a larger observed elasticity ^ ".
As the scope of the kink approaches ￿ = 1, B ! B￿ and ^ " ! " in this special case.17 Conversely,
as ￿ approaches 0, BF converges to 0 because ￿rms only cater to aggregate preferences. It follows
that the bunching observed at kinks that a⁄ect few workers in the economy constitutes a pure
indi⁄erent between retaining h
0
i and searching for their optimal job. To simplify notation, we classify these workers
as ￿individual bunchers￿by assuming that they choose to search for a new job.
16In this special case, the total amount of bunching including all workers (both L and NL) equals the amount of
bunching in the frictionless case (￿ = 0) because G(h) = G
￿(h). However, the composition of those at the kink
di⁄ers when ￿ > 0: some of those who bunch face the linear tax. This is why ^ " < " for workers of type NL. In the
general model where workers face ￿nite adjustment costs, G(h) 6= G
￿(h) and total bunching no longer coincides with
that in the frictionless case.
17The convergence of B to B
￿ only occurs in this special case. In the general model, B < B
￿ when ￿ = 1 for most
parameter values. However, one can sometimes obtain B > B
￿ when ￿ = 1 because of ￿rm bunching. The robust
testable prediction is that B rises with ￿.




This equivalence between lim￿!0 B and BI is also useful empirically because we cannot directly
observe BI, but can observe lim￿!0 B by studying bunching at kinks that apply to few workers.18
These results lead to our second testable prediction about taxes and labor supply elasticities.
Prediction 2: Search costs interact with hours constraints to generate ￿rm bunching. The amount
of ￿rm bunching and the observed elasticity rises with the fraction of workers who face the kink:







The source of ￿rm bunching is that pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms cater to workers￿preferences when
setting hours constraints. Therefore, in occupations where workers are more tax elastic, one should
observe a higher level of both individual and ￿rm bunching. To see this, consider the Q-sector
extension of the model described above. The amount of individual bunching in occupation q is
B
q
I = ￿￿Bq;￿ and the amount of ￿rm bunching is B
q
F = (1 ￿ ￿)￿Bq;￿. As the structural elasticity "q





F because ￿ and ￿ are constant.19 This leads to our third and ￿nal prediction.
Prediction 3: Firms cater to workers￿preferences ￿the amount of ￿rm bunching and individual










In Appendix A, we derive analogs of predictions 2 and 3 for observed elasticities from tax
reforms. The analog of ￿￿rm bunching￿ for tax reforms are changes in the hours constraints
imposed by ￿rms in response to changes in tax rates. These changes in hours constraints a⁄ect
hours of work even for workers whose tax incentives are una⁄ected by the reform, providing an
18This is why the bunching in special case 2 above (where ￿ = 0) is driven purely by individual search behavior
rather than ￿rm responses.
19If workers could switch between sectors, this correlation result would be reinforced because more elastic workers
would sort toward sectors with more ￿rm bunching.
17empirical measure of ￿rm responses. Tax changes that a⁄ect a larger group of workers induce larger
changes in hours constraints. As a result, the observed elasticity from a tax reform, ^ " =
dlogh
dlog(1￿￿),
increases with the scope of the reform. Firms are more responsive to tax reforms in sectors of
the economy where workers are more tax elastic, producing a correlation between observed ￿rm
responses and individual responses to tax reforms.
Micro vs. Macro Elasticities. The structural elasticity " continues to determine the macro
elasticity with ￿rm responses. Consider again the two economies with di⁄erent linear tax rates,
￿ and ￿0, for workers of type si = L. But now assume that all workers face the linear tax
(￿ = 0), so that ￿rms respond to this tax variation. The results above imply that the di⁄erence
in equilibrium hours across the two economies coincides with the di⁄erence in optimal hours. It
follows immediately that the di⁄erence in average hours of work between the two economies is
Eloghi(￿0) ￿ Eloghi(￿) = Elogh￿
i(￿0) ￿ Elogh￿
i(￿) = " ￿ (log￿0 ￿ log￿)
Hence, the observed macro elasticity equals the structural elasticity (b "MAC = ") even with ￿rm
responses. This result highlights a second reason that the macroeconomic e⁄ects of taxes may di⁄er
from microeconometric estimates. Variation in tax rates across economies shifts the aggregate
distribution of workers￿preferences and thereby induces changes in the hours constraints set by
￿rms. In contrast, tax reforms or kinks that a⁄ect a small subgroup of workers do not generate
substantial changes in hours constraints. Thus, microeconometric studies that focus on tax changes
that a⁄ect speci￿c groups of the population could signi￿cantly underestimate macro elasticities.
We derived the three predictions in special cases because the general model with ￿nite search
costs and endogenous hours constraints is analytically intractable. Using numerical simulations,
we have veri￿ed that the three predictions hold in the general model for parameters that ￿t the
data (see section V). The simulations also con￿rm that the macro elasticity coincides with " in the
general model. We therefore proceed to test the predictions empirically and determine the extent
to which adjustment costs and hours constraints attenuate micro elasticity estimates in practice.
III Institutional Background and Data
The Danish labor market is characterized by a combination of institutional regulation and ￿ exibility,
commonly termed ￿￿ exicurity.￿ Virtually all private sector jobs are covered by collective bargaining
agreements, negotiated by unions and employer associations. The collective bargains set wages
18at the occupation level as a function of seniority, quali￿cations, degree of responsibility, etc. The
contracts are typically negotiated at intervals of 2-4 years. Despite this relatively rigid bargaining
structure, rates of job turnover are relatively high and the unemployment rate is relatively low.
For example, Anderson and Svarer (2007) report that rates of job creation and job destruction
for most sectors and the overall economy in Denmark are comparable to those in the U.S. The
unemployment rate in 2000 in Denmark was 5.4%, among the lowest in Europe.
During the period we study (1994-2001), income was taxed using a three-bracket system. Figure
2a shows the tax schedule in 2000 in terms of Danish Kroner (DKr). Note that $1 ￿ DKr 6. The
marginal tax rate begins at approximately 45%, referred to as the ￿bottom tax.￿ 20 At an income
of DKr 164,300, a ￿middle tax￿ is levied in addition to the bottom tax. The net-of-tax wage
rate falls by 11% at the point where the middle bracket begins. Finally, at incomes above DKr
267,600, individuals pay the ￿top tax￿on top of the other taxes, bringing the marginal tax rate
to approximately 70%. The net-of-tax wage rate falls by 33% at the point where the top bracket
begins. Approximately 25% of wage earners pay the top tax during the period we study. The
large jump in marginal tax rates in a central part of the income distribution makes the Danish tax
system particularly interesting for our purposes.21
Figure 2b plots the movement in the top bracket cuto⁄ across years in real and nominal terms.
Danish tax law stipulates that the movement in the top tax bracket from year t to year t + 1 is
a pre-determined function of wage growth in the economy from year t ￿ 2 to year t ￿ 1 (two-year
lagged wage growth). This mechanical, pre-determined movement of the cuto⁄s rules out potential
concerns that the bracket cuto⁄s may be endogenously set as a function of labor market contracts.
Over the period of study, in￿ ation was between 1.8% and 2.9% per year. Because of the adjustment
rule, the top bracket cuto⁄ declines in real terms from 1994-1997 and then increases sharply from
1998-2001.
In addition to the variation in tax rates across brackets, there were also some small tax reforms
during the period we study. For example, before 1996, there were two separate middle taxes that
were consolidated into a single middle tax in subsequent years. Starting in 1999, capital losses
could not be deducted from the middle tax base and contributions to certain types of pensions
could no longer be deducted from the top tax base. Finally, the middle and top tax bracket cuto⁄s
20Individuals with very low incomes (3% of wage earners) are exempt from this bottom tax.
21Denmark also has a complex transfer system that a⁄ects incentives for low incomes (Kleven and Kreiner 2006).
We do not model the transfer system here because transfer programs a⁄ect very few individuals￿marginal incentives
around the middle and top tax cuto⁄s that are the focus of our empirical analysis.
19change in real terms across years. These tax reforms generate changes in net-of-tax rates between
-10% to +10% for certain subgroups of the population, yielding several tax changes of small size
and scope.
We study behavior at the individual level because spouses ￿le individual tax returns, but there
some joint aspects of the tax system, which we account for in our analysis. There are two tax
bases relevant for our analysis: one for the top tax and one for the middle taxes. We use the term
￿taxable income￿to refer to the tax base relevant to a particular tax; for instance, when studying
bunching around the top tax cuto⁄, we use ￿taxable income￿to refer to the top tax base.22 Wage
earnings, self-employment income, transfer payments, and gifts are all subject to both the middle
and top income taxes. Most pension contributions are tax deductible and the marginal dollar
of capital income is not subject to the top tax for most individuals. These features of the tax
code create an incentive to shift earnings from labor income to capital income and pensions. See
Ministry of Taxation (2002) for a more comprehensive description of the Danish tax system.
Data. We merge several administrative registers provided by Statistics Denmark. The pri-
mary dataset is the tax register from 1994-2001, which contains panel data on wage earnings,
self-employment income, pensions, capital income and deductions, spouse ID, and several other
characteristics. The tax register contains records for more than 99.9% of individuals between the
ages of 15-70 in the population. We merge the tax data with the Danish Integrated Database
for Labor Market Research (IDA), which includes data on education, ￿rm ID, occupation, labor
market experience, and number of children for every person in Denmark. Additional details on
the dataset and variable de￿nitions are given in Appendix B.
Starting from the population dataset, we restrict attention to individuals who (1) are between
the ages of 15 and 70 and (2) are wage earners, excluding the self-employed and pensioners.23 These
exclusions leave us with an analysis sample of 17.9 million observations of wage earners. Much of
our analysis focuses on the subset of 6.8 million observations for wage earners that fall within DKr
50,000 of the top tax cuto⁄. We also study the 1.8 million observations of self-employed individuals
separately.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the population of 15-70 year olds as a whole, all wage
earners, the subset of wage earners within DKr 50,000 of the top tax cuto⁄, and self-employed
22The Danish tax system includes a technical concept of ￿Taxable Income.￿ Our use of the term ￿taxable income￿
does not refer to that technical concept.
23The endogenous sample selection induced by dropping the self-employed does not spuriously generate bunching.
There is signi￿cant bunching in the wage earnings distribution even in the full population: b = 0:73 in the full
population vs. b = 0:71 for the subgroup of wage earners reported in Figure 7 below.
20individuals. The mean individual personal (non-capital) income in the population is DKr 180,213
($30,000) for the population and DKr 227,359 ($38,000) for wage earners. Mean net capital income
is negative because mortgage interest payments exceed capital income for most individuals. We
de￿ne ￿net deductions￿as deductions minus non-wage income (accounting for spousal deductions),
or equivalently, wage earnings minus taxable income. Most wage earners have small net deductions
(60% have deductions less than DKr 7,500 in magnitude), a fact that proves useful for our empirical
analysis. The mean level of net deductions is negative because some individuals have substantial
non-wage income.
We construct a tax simulator that calculates tax liabilities and marginal tax rates using these
data. The tax simulator predicts actual tax liabilities within DKr 5 ($1) for 95% of the individuals
in the population. Over the period we consider, top marginal tax rates were reduced slightly,
and thus the simulated net-of-tax rate (holding ￿xed base-year characteristics) rises by 2.25% on
average across two-year intervals.
IV Empirical Analysis
We begin by analyzing bunching at the top bracket cuto⁄, where net-of-tax wages fall by approx-
imately 30%. Figure 3 plots the empirical distribution of taxable income for all wage earners in
Denmark from 1994-2001. To construct this histogram, we ￿rst calculate the di⁄erence between
the actual taxable income and the taxable income needed to reach the top tax bracket for each
observation. We then group individuals into DKr 1,000 bins (-500 to 500, 500 to 1500, etc.) on
this recentered taxable income variable. Finally, we plot the bin counts around the top bracket
cuto⁄, demarcated by the red vertical line at zero.
Figure 3 shows that there is a spike around the top bracket cuto⁄ in the otherwise smooth and
monotonically declining income distribution. As shown in equation (6), the observed elasticity b "
implied by this bunching is proportional to b(￿1;￿2), the excess mass relative to the density around
the kink K. A complication in measuring b empirically is that noise in non-wage income yi leads
to di⁄use excess mass around K rather than a point mass at K. To measure b in the presence of
such noise, we must estimate a counterfactual density ￿what the distribution would look like if
there were no change in the tax rate at K. To do so, we ￿rst ￿t a polynomial to the counts plotted









i ￿ 1[Zj = i] + "0
j
where Cj is the number of individuals in income bin j, Zj is income relative to the kink in 1,000
Kroner intervals (Zj = f￿50;￿49;::;50g), q is the order of the polynomial, and R denotes the width
of the excluded region around the kink (measured in DKr 1,000). We de￿ne an initial estimate of
the counterfactual distribution as the predicted values from this regression omitting the contribution
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locate near the kink relative to this counterfactual density is b b0
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simple calculation overestimates bn because it does not account for the fact that the additional mass
at the kink comes from points to the right of the kink; that is, it does not satisfy the constraint
that the area under the counterfactual must equal the area under the empirical distribution. To
account for this problem, we shift the counterfactual distribution to the right of the kink upward
until it satis￿es the integration constraint. In particular, we de￿ne the counterfactual distribution
b Cj = b ￿i ￿ (Zj)i as the ￿tted values from the regression






￿i ￿ (Zj)i +
R X
i=￿R
￿i ￿ 1[Zj = i] + "j
where b bn =
PR
j=￿R Cj ￿ b Cj =
R X
i=￿R
b ￿i is the excess mass implied by this counterfactual.24 Finally,
we de￿ne our empirical estimate of b as the excess mass around the kink relative to the average
density of the counterfactual earnings distribution between ￿R and R:
(16) b b =
b bn
PR
j=￿R b Cj=(2R + 1)
The solid curve in Figure 3 shows the counterfactual density fb Cjg predicted using this procedure
with a seventh-degree polynomial (q = 7) and a window of DKr 15,000 centered around the kink
(R = 7). The shaded region shows the estimated excess mass around the kink. With these
parameters, we estimate b = 0:81 ￿the excess mass around the kink is 81% of the average height
24Because b bn is a function of e ￿i, the dependent variable in this regression depends upon the estimates of e ￿i. We
therefore estimate (15) by iteration, recomputing b bn using the estimated e ￿i until we reach a ￿xed point. The
bootstrapped standard errors that we report below adjust for this iterative estimation procedure.
22of the counterfactual distribution within DKr 7,500 of the kink. We choose q = R = 7 based on
the numerical simulations of the calibrated model described in section V below. In particular, the
estimated b b using (16) is within 15% of the true value in the frictionless model for b 2 [0;5] when
FY (yi) is calibrated to match the variance of non-wage income in the data. The qualitative results
we report below are not sensitive to changes in q and R or the way in which we correct the coun-
terfactual to satisfy the integration constraint.25 The reason is that the di⁄erences we document
in observed elasticities are much larger than the changes induced by varying the speci￿cation of
the counterfactual.
We calculate a standard error for b b using a parametric bootstrap procedure. We draw from
the estimated vector of errors "j in (15) with replacement to generate a new set of counts and
apply the technique above to calculate a new estimate ^ bk. We de￿ne the standard error of ^ b as the
standard deviation of the distribution of ^ bks. Since we observe the exact population distribution
of taxable income, this standard error re￿ ects error due to misspeci￿cation of the polynomial for
the counterfactual income distribution rather than sampling error. In Figure 3, the standard error
associated with our estimate of b is 0:05. The null hypothesis that there is no excess mass at
the kink relative to the counterfactual distribution is rejected with a t-statistic of 17:6, implying
p < 1 ￿ 10￿9.
There is substantial heterogeneity across groups in the amount of bunching. Panel A in Figure
4 shows that excess mass at the kink is much larger for married women (b = 1:79) than for single
men (b = 0:25), consistent with existing evidence that married women exhibit the highest labor
supply elasticities. Panel B shows that there is also substantial heterogeneity across occupations:
teachers exhibit substantial bunching around the kink (b = 3:54), whereas the military does not
(b = ￿0:12, statistically insigni￿cant).26 We return to explore the sources of this heterogeneity in
Section IV.C below.
The identi￿cation assumption underlying causal inference about the e⁄ect of taxes on earnings
in the preceding analysis is that the income distribution would be smooth if there were no jump in
tax rates at the location of the top bracket cuto⁄. This identi￿cation assumption can be relaxed by
exploiting the movement in the top bracket cuto⁄ across years. Figure 5 displays the distribution
of taxable income in each year from 1994-2001 for all wage earners and for married women. The
25For example, we obtain similar results by shifting the counterfactual rightward instead of upward to satisfy the
integration constraint. Any of these counterfactual adjustments have small e⁄ects on the excess mass calculations.
Even our intial unadjusted estimate b b
0
n di⁄ers from the adjusted estimate b bn by less than 10%.
26Approximatley 50% of wage earners in Denmark work in the public sector. We ￿nd slightly more bunching for
those employed in the private sector (b = 0:67) than those in the public sector (b = 0:5).
23excess mass for both groups follows the movement in the top bracket cuto⁄ very closely. In Figure
6, we investigate whether the excess mass tracks tax changes, in￿ ation, or average wage growth over
time. Figure 6a considers the period from 1994 to 1997, during which the top tax cuto⁄ declines
in real terms. Noting that the excess mass is located at the top tax cuto⁄ in 1994, the ￿gure
shows three possibilities for its location in 1997: the 1997 top tax cuto⁄, the 1994 cuto⁄ adjusted
for in￿ ation, and the 1994 cuto⁄ adjusted for average wage growth in the economy. In both the
full population of wage earners and the subgroup of married women, the excess mass at the 1994
kink clearly moves to the 1997 kink rather than following in￿ ation or average wage growth. Figure
6b replicates Figure 6a for the period from 1997 to 2001, during which the top tax cuto⁄ rises
in real terms. In this ￿gure, the dashed vertical lines show the 1997 top tax cuto⁄ adjusted for
in￿ ation and wage growth. Again, the excess masses clearly follow the movement in the top tax
cuto⁄ rather than in￿ ation or average wage growth. We conclude that earnings dynamics around
the top tax bracket depart from prevailing in￿ ation patterns and instead are aligned with changes
in the tax system. We show that ￿rm responses explain why the excess mass tracks the movement
of the kink so closely despite frictions in Figure 17 below.
Shifting vs. Real Responses. Individuals can obtain taxable income near the top bracket cuto⁄
through two margins: changes in labor supply (e.g. hours worked) or ￿income shifting￿responses
such as changes from taxed to untaxed forms of compensation. Our three theoretical predictions
about how frictions a⁄ect observed taxable income elasticities hold regardless of what margins
underlie changes in taxable income. Intuitively, if ￿rms face technological constraints that limit
the bene￿t packages workers can choose from, tax changes of larger size and scope will continue to
produce larger taxable income elasticities. Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish between these
two behavioral responses because income shifting and ￿real￿changes in labor supply have di⁄erent
normative implications (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, Chetty 2009b).
There are two channels through which individuals can change their reported taxable income
without changing labor supply: evasion and avoidance. Kleven et al. (2009a) conduct an audit
study of Danish tax records and ￿nd that there is virtually no tax evasion in wage earnings because
of third-party reporting by ￿rms. The lower series in Figure 7 plots the distribution of wage
earnings, de￿ned using the same line on the tax form as the wage earnings variable audited by
Kleven et al. It shows that there is substantial bunching (b = 0:68) even in this narrowest, double-
reported measure of compensation. We therefore conclude that the bunching we observe is not
driven by evasion.
24The second and more important income shifting channel is legal tax avoidance. The simplest
method of reducing current tax liabilities is to contribute to tax-deductible pension accounts. We
investigate the extent of such shifting by adding employer and employee pension contributions back
to taxable income. The upper series in Figure 7 plots the distribution of this broader measure
of compensation relative to the statutory top tax bracket cuto⁄ that would apply to individuals
with zero pension contributions. There is still considerable bunching at the top kink, rejecting
the hypothesis that all of the bunching observed in taxable income is driven by shifts to pensions.
The excess mass around the top bracket is now smaller than in Figure 3: b = 0:48 for pensions
plus taxable income, compared with b = 0:81 for taxable income. This is not surprising because
the vertical line at zero no longer represents the point at which tax rates jump for individuals who
make pension contributions. For such individuals, there is no reason to locate at this point even if
they are only changing labor supply. To correct for this mechanical attenuation e⁄ect, we rescale
the estimated excess mass by the fraction of individuals who make pension contributions of more
than DKr 7,500 (which would pull them out of the window we use to compute excess mass). This
fraction is approximately 30%, implying an adjusted b = 0:48=(1 ￿ 0:3) = 0:69. We conclude that
pension shifting is responsible for less than 15% of the bunching in taxable income observed at the
top tax cuto⁄. The relatively small amount of pension shifting is likely driven by the generosity
of Denmark￿ s social security programs. An analogous exercise shows that shifting into capital
income, which is untaxed in the top tax base, is responsible for virtually none of the bunching at
the top kink.
Although the behavioral responses at the top tax cuto⁄ do not appear to be driven by any
observable method of income shifting, we cannot rule out the possibility that individuals shift their
compensation to unobservable nontaxable compensation to avoid paying the top income tax. For
example, we cannot detect substitution of compensation from wage earnings into o¢ ce amenities
when individuals cross into the top tax bracket. We also cannot rule out intertemporal shifting of
wage earnings to avoid paying the top tax. The only way to de￿nitively rule out such responses
is to examine changes in hours worked directly. Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain
information on hours of work. Nevertheless, we believe that most of the observed bunching in
taxable income re￿ ects ￿real￿ distortions in behavior that have e¢ ciency costs. Few salaried
workers at the 75th percentile of the income distribution have the ability to shift income into
other forms of compensation or across time (Slemrod 1995, Goolsbee 2000). Moreover, even if
compensation is distorted toward o¢ ce amenities instead of wages, the marginal e¢ ciency cost of
25such distortions equals the marginal e¢ ciency cost of changes in hours of work (Feldstein 1999).
IV.A Prediction 1: Size of Tax Changes
We now test the ￿rst prediction by comparing the amount of bunching at the top tax kink with
bunching at smaller kinks and observed elasticities from small tax reforms. Figure 8 shows the
distributions of taxable income around the middle tax cuto⁄, where the net-of-tax rate falls by
between 7% and 10%.27 Panel A of Figure 8 shows that is virtually no bunching at the middle
tax cuto⁄ (b = 0:06) in taxable income for the full population of wage earners. Moreover, the
estimated excess mass at the middle tax converges to zero as the degree of the polynomial in
increased, whereas the estimated excess mass at the top kink is not sensitive to the degree of the
polynomial. Because the tax base for the middle tax di⁄ers slightly from that of the top tax,
in Panel B we plot the distribution of wage earnings around the middle tax cuto⁄. There is no
evidence of bunching in wage earnings, unlike at the top tax cuto⁄. Panels C and D show that the
amount of bunching remains small and statistically insigni￿cant even for the subsample of married
women, who exhibit substantial bunching at the top kink as shown in Figure 4a.
Note that smaller kinks should generate less bunching even in the frictionless model, simply
because the change in incentives is smaller. We therefore compare the excess mass at these smaller
kinks with the amount of excess mass that would be generated if the elasticity were the same as
that implied by the excess mass at the large top tax kink. In all cases, the amount of bunching
observed in the empirical distribution at the middle kink is signi￿cantly less than what would be
predicted by the frictionless model. For example, the frictionless model predicts b = 0:16 at the
middle kink for all wage earners (Panel A). The null hypothesis that the predicted excess mass
equals the actual excess mass at the middle kink can be rejected with p < 0:01.
Next, we estimate observed elasticities using changes in marginal rates by legislated reforms.
As described in Section III, there were a number of small tax reforms in Denmark between 1994 and
2001 that created changes in net-of-tax rates of between -10% and +10%. These reforms generate
di⁄erential changes in net-of-tax rates across income groups, motivating a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
research design that is the benchmark in the taxable income literature (Saez et al. 2009). Let
￿logyi;t = logyi;t ￿ logyi;t￿2 denote the log change in wage earnings from period t ￿ 2 to t and
￿log(1￿MTRi;t) the log change in net-of-tax rates over the same period. Following Gruber and
27In 1994 and 1995, the tax system includes an additional ￿upper middle tax.￿ Figure 8 only considers the lower
middle tax in these years, but there is no bunching at the upper middle tax cuto⁄ either.
26Saez (2002), we estimate the following regression speci￿cation using two-stage-least-squares:
(17) ￿logyi;t = ￿ + ￿￿log(1 ￿ MTRi;t) + f(yi;t￿2) + ￿Xi;t￿2 + "i;t,
instrumenting for ￿log(1 ￿ MTRi;t) with ￿log(1 ￿ MTRsim
i;t ), the simulated change in net-of-tax
rates holding the individual￿ s income and other characteristics ￿xed at their year t￿2 levels. The
function f(yi;t￿2) is a 10 piece linear spline in base year wage earnings and the vector Xi;t￿2 is a set
of base year controls that we vary across speci￿cations. First-stage regressions of ￿log(1￿MTRi;t)
on ￿log(1￿MTRsim
i;t ) have coe¢ cients of approximately 0.6 with F-statistics exceeding 400. The
average size of the tax changes used to identify ￿ in (17) is Ej￿log(1 ￿ MTRsim
i;t )j = 4%.
Table 2 reports TSLS estimates from several variants of (17). In column 1, we estimate (17) on
the full population of wage earners with the following controls: the 10-piece wage earnings spline,
a 10-piece spline in total personal income and age and year ￿xed e⁄ects. The estimated elasticity
b " is very close to 0, and the upper bound of the 95% CI is b " = 0:001. Column 2 adds a 10 piece
capital income spline, gender and marital status dummies, and occupation and region ￿xed e⁄ects
as controls. The estimated elasticity remains very close to zero, showing that the estimates are
robust to the set of covariates used to predict income growth. Column 3 considers the subgroup of
married women using the baseline speci￿cation in column 1. The observed elasticity in response to
small tax changes remains near 0 for married women despite the fact that they exhibit substantial
bunching at the large top tax kink, as shown in Figure 4. In column 4, we further restrict the
sample to married women who are professionals and have above-median (more than 19 years) labor
market experience. This subgroup also does not react signi￿cantly to small tax reforms, yet it
exhibits substantial bunching at the top kink (b = 4:50, with an implied observed elasticity of 0:06).
These results match those of Kleven and Schultz (2010), who estimate a similar set of speci￿cations
and ￿nd near-zero observed elasticities using tax reforms spanning a larger set of years in Denmark.
Figure 9 compiles the evidence on observed elasticities and the size of tax changes by plotting
observed elasticities (^ ") vs. the change in the net-of-tax-rate ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) used for identi￿cation.
We convert the excess mass (b) estimated at the middle and top tax kinks analyzed above into
observed elasticities using equation (6). The change in the net-of-tax rate at the middle tax cuto⁄
ranged from 8.9%-9.9% in 1994-1996 vs. 11.4%-11.7% from 1997-2001. We therefore estimate
separate excess masses and observed elasticities at the middle tax cuto⁄ for these two sets of years.
Similarly, we estimate two observed elasticities for the top tax cuto⁄: one pooling 1994, 1997,
27and 1998 (changes in NTR from 28.1%-30.7%) and another pooling 1995, 1996, and 1999-2001
(31.9%-35.4%). The ￿gure also shows the elasticity estimate using small tax reforms (which have
an average size of ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) = 4%), using the estimate from Column 1 of Table 2. Recall that
the benchmark frictionless model predicts that ^ " does not vary with ￿log(1 ￿ ￿). To test this
hypothesis, we ￿t a linear regression to the ￿ve observed elasticity estimates. The hypothesis that
the slope of the regression line equals zero is rejected with a t-statistic of 3.6 (p < 0:05), supporting
prediction 1. The same upward sloping relationship holds across various age groups, years, regions,
and occupations.
Although the observed elasticities rise with the size of the tax change, the elasticity implied
by the frictionless model remains very small even at the largest kink. For all wage earners, the
observed elasticity from bunching at the 30% kink is b " ’ 0:01, while for married women it is
b " ’ 0:02. In section V, we calibrate the model and show that the structural (or macro) elasticity
that matches the estimates in Figure 9 is " ￿ 0:34, an order of magnitude larger than the observed
elasticity at the top kink.
Search Costs vs. Non-Constant Elasticities. If "(￿;z) varies with ￿ or z, the upward sloping
relationship in Figure 9 could potentially be due to variation in " rather than adjustment costs. In
our application, the middle kinks are at incomes of DKr 130,000-177,900, while the top kinks are at
incomes of DKr 234,900-276,900. If higher income individuals are more elastic, one would observe
the pattern in Figure 9 even without frictions. We distinguish this explanation of our ￿ndings
from frictions using three approaches.
First, we build upon the results in Section II.C and analyze the e⁄ects of small tax changes on
the subset of high income individuals who face the top tax to begin with. If the local structural
elasticity "(￿;z) around the top kink is larger than "(￿;z) around the middle kinks, then a small
change in the top tax rate should generate large behavioral responses. But if the di⁄erence in
observed elasticities is due to frictions, this small tax change should not generate a signi￿cant
response. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 show estimates of the observed elasticity for all wage earners
and married women using the baseline speci￿cation in column 1, restricting attention to those
with wage earnings exceeding DKr 200,000. The estimated elasticities remain very close to zero.
Even conditional on initial income and marginal tax rates, small tax changes induce little or no
behavioral response, while larger tax changes induce much larger responses.
Second, we examine how the degree of bunching changes as the middle and top tax cuto⁄s
move across years. In the latter years of our sample, the middle tax cuto⁄ is higher in the income
28distribution, but the amount of bunching remains near zero (not shown). In contrast, bunching
at the top kink remains substantial across all the years as the bracket cuto⁄ moves up, as shown
in Figure 5. These results suggest that the heterogeneity in elasticities across income levels is not
signi￿cant in the range we study.
As a third test of whether preference heterogeneity drives the di⁄erential bunching at the middle
and top kinks, we focus on a subset of individuals whose incomes place them within DKr 50;000
of the top kink in year t and within DKr 50;000 of the middle kink in year t + 2. By studying
these ￿switchers,￿we can e⁄ectively remove individual ￿xed e⁄ects when comparing responses to
the middle and top kinks. Figure 10 displays the distributions of taxable income for the group of
switchers at each kink. When near the top kink, these individuals exhibit substantial bunching
(b = 0:54). However, just two years later, the same individuals show no excess propensity to
bunch at the middle kink (b = 0:06) despite having earnings near that kink. The opposite pattern
is observed for those moving from the middle to the top kink (not shown). We conclude that
variation in "(￿;z) is unlikely to explain the upward-sloping pattern in Figure 9.
Perceptions of the Middle vs. Top Cuto⁄s. In Chetty et al. (2010), we report the results of
an internet survey that asked individuals to report their best guess of the top tax and middle tax
cuto⁄s in the current year. The survey, conducted from March-April 2009, was administered to
members of a union representing public and ￿nancial sector employees (FTF-A). Our questions
were attached to the end of a longer survey on perceptions of the union. 3,299 individuals (11%
of the union members) responded to our questions.
Figure 11 displays the distribution of respondents￿perceptions of the middle and top tax cuto⁄s.
Each point depicts the fraction of responses in a DKr 30;000 bin centered around the true cuto⁄s,
shown by the vertical lines. Knowledge of the top tax cuto⁄ is better than the middle tax cuto⁄.
Approximately 41% of the those surveyed know the top tax cuto⁄to within DKr 15;000 of the true
level; in contrast, only 27% know the middle tax cuto⁄ with this level of accuracy. The median
absolute error for the top tax cuto⁄ is DKr 21,200, compared with DKr 31,000 for the middle tax
cuto⁄. The same qualitative pattern is exhibited across all education levels and occupations in
the sample. These survey responses must be viewed as anecdotal evidence because the survey was
administered only to members of FTF-A and because the response rate for the questions we added
is only 11%. Nevertheless, this evidence is consistent with our ￿nding that observed elasticities
are larger at the top kink than the middle kink, as well as recent evidence that the information and
salience a⁄ect behavioral responses to income taxation (e.g. Chetty and Saez 2009).
29IV.B Prediction 2: Firm Bunching and Scope of Tax Changes
To test the second prediction, we begin by identifying a source of variation in the scope of kinks
￿the fraction of workers in the economy who face a given kink in the tax system. Recall that
taxable income is the sum of wage earnings and non-wage income minus deductions. Deductions
consist primarily of pension contributions. Non-wage income includes items such as alimony
receipts, stipends, and unemployment bene￿ts. Because of heterogeneity in non-wage income and
deductions, the wage earnings required to reach the middle and top brackets vary across individuals.
Figure 12a shows a histogram of net deductions (deductions minus non-wage income) in the
top tax base. Approximately 60% of wage earners have net deductions less than DKr 7;500 in
magnitude, as shown in Table 1. This is because most individuals in Denmark make no pension
contributions and earn only wage income. Thus, most individuals cross into the top tax bracket
when their wage earnings exceed the top tax cuto⁄that applies to taxable income, which we term the
￿statutory￿top tax cuto⁄. The distribution of deductions for the remaining 40% of individuals
is di⁄use, with one exception, highlighted in Figure 12b. This ￿gure shows the distribution of
deductions conditional on having deductions greater than DKr 20,000. There is a spike in the
distribution of deductions at DKr 33;000, demarcated by the solid vertical line, which is driven by
a cap on tax-deductible pension contributions at DKr 33;000.28 These individuals, who constitute
2.7% of wage earners, reach the top tax bracket only when their wage earnings exceed the statutory
top tax cuto⁄ by DKr 33;000.
In this setting, the second prediction of our model consists of three parts: we should observe
(1) signi￿cant ￿rm bunching at the statutory top tax kink that applies to 60% of workers, (2)
little ￿rm bunching at the ￿pension kink￿that applies to 2.7% of workers, and (3) more bunching
for individuals with small deductions, as they have more common tax preferences. To test these
hypotheses, we study wage earnings distributions at the occupation level because most wages are
set through collective bargains at the occupation level in Denmark.
Firm bunching is easiest to see through case studies of occupations. Consider school teachers,
who constitute approximately 3% of wage earners in Denmark and form one of the largest unions.
Figure 13a plots the distribution of wage earnings around the top tax bracket for teachers. There
is very sharp bunching around the statutory top tax cuto⁄, consistent with the sharp bunching in
taxable income shown in Figure 4b.29 Intuitively, the rate of return to negotiating for higher wages
28The pension contribution cap increases slightly over time. In Figure 12b, the distribution of deductions has been
recentered so that the cap falls at 33,000 in each year.
29The smaller peak above the kink is driven by teachers in Copenhagen, who receive a cost-of-living adjustment
30falls discontinuously for the vast majority of teachers at the top tax bracket cuto⁄. It is therefore
sensible that teachers start bargaining on other dimensions, such as lighter teaching loads or more
vacations, rather than continue to push for wage increases beyond this point.
Figure 13b plots the distribution of wage earnings (salaries) around the statutory top tax cuto⁄
for teachers with net deductions greater than DKr 20,000. The individuals in this ￿gure do not
begin to pay the top tax on wage earnings until at least DKr 20;000 beyond the statutory top tax
cuto⁄, and therefore experience no change in net-of-tax wages at the vertical line at zero. Yet the
wage earnings distribution for these workers is extremely similar to the distribution for teachers as
a whole, and exhibits sharp bunching at the statutory top tax cuto⁄. This is the signature of ￿rm
bunching: even individuals who are una⁄ected by a kink bunch there. Intuitively, school districts
are forced to o⁄er a limited number of wage-hours packages in order to coordinate class schedules.
Because of such technological constraints, teachers￿contracts cater to the aggregate tax incentives
re￿ ected in the population. The fact that many teachers would prefer a salary that places them
near the statutory kink distorts the earnings of the minority of teachers whose tax incentives di⁄er.
There are similar patterns of ￿rm bunching in many other occupations. We generalize from
such case studies by analyzing the modes of the earnings distribution in each occupation, de￿ned
using the International Labour Organization￿ s 4 digit International Standard Classi￿cation of Oc-
cupations (ISCO) codes. We de￿ne the mode in each occupation-year cell as the DKr 5,000 wage
earnings bin that has the largest number of workers. Figure 14 shows a histogram of these modes
relative to the top tax bracket cuto⁄, excluding small occupation-years that have less than 7,000
workers (25% of the sample). The density of modes drops sharply at the top tax threshold. There
are 20 modes within DKr 2000 of the top tax cuto⁄, but only 6 in the adjacent bin from DKr 2,000
to DKr 6,000 above the kink. This drop in the frequency of modes across these two bins is larger
than any other drop across two contiguous bins in the ￿gure. Moreover, as the top tax cuto⁄ rises
over years, the distribution of modes shifts along with the cuto⁄ (not shown). Hence, aggregate
tax incentives ￿which are determined largely by the preferences of workers who face the statutory
cuto⁄ ￿shape the distribution of jobs o⁄ered by ￿rms as the model predicts.
Having established the prevalence of ￿rm bunching at the most common kink, we test whether
kinks that a⁄ect fewer workers generate less ￿rm bunching. To do so, we exploit the ￿pension
kink￿described above. Figure 15a plots the distribution of wage earnings relative to the pension
of DKr 15,000 over the base teacher￿ s salary. The setting of salaries to place teachers outside Copenhagen ￿who
account for 75% of all teachers ￿at the top kink supports the view that institutional constraints are endogenously
set based on the preferences of the largest groups in the population.
31kink (shown by the vertical line at 0) for individuals who have deductions greater than DKr 20,000.
There is signi￿cant bunching in wage earnings at the pension kink (b = 0:70).30 To investigate
whether this bunching is driven by ￿rm o⁄ers or individual job search, Figure 15b replicates 15a
for workers with deductions between DKr 7,500 and DKr 25,000. Note that these workers￿tax
incentives change at neither the statutory kink nor the pension kink. These workers exhibit no
excess propensity to locate near the pension kink (b = ￿0:04), implying that there is little ￿rm
bunching at the pension kink. In contrast, Figure 15c shows that the same workers exhibit
substantial bunching around the statutory kink (b = 0:58), con￿rming that there is signi￿cant ￿rm
bunching at the statutory kink. Together, these ￿gures o⁄er two lessons. First, the bunching at
the pension kink is driven by individual job search ￿i.e., ￿nding a job that pays DKr 33,000 above
the top kink ￿rather than distortions in the distribution of o⁄ers.31 Second, ￿rm bunching is
signi￿cant only at kinks that a⁄ect large groups of workers, consistent with the model￿ s prediction
that ￿rms cater to aggregate worker preferences.
We now turn to the third part of prediction 2: do workers with small deductions bunch more
than those with large deductions? The econometric challenge in testing this prediction is that
deductions themselves are endogenous. In particular, workers with large deductions may have
chosen their deductions in order to reach the top tax kink.32 We address this endogeneity problem
using a grouping instrument. We compute the fraction of workers with deductions less than DKr
7,500 in magnitude for cells of the population de￿ned by marital status, gender, year, and age
(in decades). We then divide workers into ten equal-width bins based on the fraction of workers
with small deductions in their group and estimate the degree of bunching at the top kink (b) for
workers in each of these ten bins.33 Figure 16 plots the estimated b vs. the fraction of workers
with small deductions in the ten groups. The groups with small deductions exhibit much greater
bunching: the slope of the ￿tted line in Figure 16 is statistically signi￿cant with p < 0:01. This
30We condition on having deductions greater than DKr 20,000 to isolate the relevant part of the population in
order to detect bunching at the pension kink. To allay the concern that conditioning on deductions greater than
DKr 20,000 creates selection bias, we veri￿ed that conditioning on deductions in the previous year produces similar
results (b = 0:54). We also ran a series of placebo tests conditioning on having deductions above thresholds ranging
from -20,000 to 40,000 and found no bunching at any points in the wage earnings distribution except for the statutory
kink and the pension kink.
31There is also no bunching (b = ￿0:01) at the middle tax pension kink (the point at which individuals who are
at the pension cap begin paying the middle tax). This ￿nding further supports prediction 1 by showing that size
matters regardless of scope: a large kink that a⁄ects few workers generates more bunching than a small kink that
a⁄ects few workers.
32This endogeneity problem did not arise in testing the ￿rst two parts of prediction 2 because they did not require
comparisons between individuals with di⁄erent levels of deductions.
33We exclude groups with a fraction of workers with small deductions in the bottom and top 5% of the distribution,
as there are too few observations to estimate b in equal-width bins in the tails.
32result con￿rms that tax incentives that a⁄ect a larger group of workers generate large observed
elasticities. Workers with small deductions can rely on ￿rm bunching to reach the top kink,
whereas workers with large deductions need to actively search for a less common job.
Although our model does not fully characterize the dynamics of adjustment to tax changes,
￿rm responses appear to play a central role in earnings dynamics empirically. To characterize
earnings dynamics, we de￿ne an indicator for whether an individual￿ s change in wage earnings from
year t to year t + 2 is within DKr 7500 (the width of our bunching window) of the change in the
top tax bracket cuto⁄ from year t to year t + 2. This indicator measures whether an individual￿ s
earnings tracks the movement in the kink over time. Figure 17a plots the fraction of individuals
who track the movement in the kink vs. the level of wage earnings in the base year relative to
the statutory kink. The propensity to track the movement in the kink is highest for individuals
near the kink to begin with. Figure 17b replicates Figure 17a for the pension kink, focusing on
individuals with deductions greater than 20,000 in year t, as in Figure 15a. Individuals at the
pension kink in year t do not have any excess propensity to track the movement in the pension kink.
Instead, ￿rm bunchers at the statutory kink (located at approximately DKr -33,000 in Figure 17b),
exhibit a higher propensity to move with the kink even though they have no incentive to do so. In
sum, individuals who reach the kink via ￿rm bunching move with the kink whereas those who get
there through individual job search do not. Intuitively, ￿rms adjust the packages they o⁄er as the
aggregate distribution of workers￿tax preferences change, whereas workers do not pay search costs
to switch jobs and actively track the kink themselves.34
We conclude that ￿rm responses play a central role in shaping the e⁄ects of tax changes on
equilibrium labor supply. Firm responses may be particularly easy to detect in Denmark because
collective bargaining facilitates such responses. While collective bargaining is less common in
economies such as the U.S., technological constraints force coordination of work schedules and lead
to hours constraints and other institutional rigidities in all labor markets. The key lesson of the
evidence here is that these constraints are endogenous to the tax regime. Although changes in taxes
may not induce sharp, immediate responses by ￿rms as in Denmark, they could induce changes in
norms and job characteristics over time.
34These results also provide further evidence that the di⁄erence in bunching at the top and middle kinks is not
driven by heterogeneous elasticities. If individuals near the top tax cuto⁄ were simply more elastic and did not face
adjustment costs, they would track the movement of the top kink over time.
33IV.C Prediction 3: Correlation Between Individual and Firm Bunching
We test the third prediction of the model by examining the correlation between individual and ￿rm
bunching across occupations. As above, we measure ￿rm bunching bF by the excess mass in the
wage earnings distribution at the statutory top tax cuto⁄ for individuals who have more than DKr
20,000 in deductions (and therefore have no incentive to locate at the statutory kink). We de￿ne
individual bunching bI as the excess mass at the pension kink in the wage earnings distribution
for individuals with more than DKr 20,000 in deductions. Note that bF and bI are estimates of
bunching at two di⁄erent kinks for the same group of individuals, and thus are not mechanically
related.
Figure 18 plots the estimates of bF vs. estimates of bI across occupations de￿ned at the 2 digit
ISCO level.35 The (unweighted) correlation between bF and bI is 0.65 and is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from 0 with p < 0:001. In a regression weighted by occupation size, 64% of the variation in bF is
explained by the variation in bI. Note that the few negative point estimates of bI and bF are not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. We cannot interpret this correlation as evidence that di⁄erences
in individuals￿preferences cause changes in ￿rm behavior as they could also be driven by sorting
of workers into occupations that suit their tastes. Nevertheless, the evidence is consistent with the
model￿ s prediction that ￿rms cater to their workers￿tax-distorted preferences in equilibrium.36
Di⁄erences across occupations drive much of the heterogeneity in bunching across demographic
groups documented above in Figure 4. To illustrate this, Figures 19a and 19b show the distributions
of taxable income for women (b = 1:37) and men (b = 0:46). The income distribution for men shown
in circles in Figure 19b reweights the sample to match the observed distribution of occupations
for women (following Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996)). This distribution e⁄ectively places
more weight on men who work in female-dominated occupations such as teaching. This simple
reweighting increases the excess mass observed among men to b = 0:85, closing nearly half the gap
in observed elasticities between men and women.37 These results underscore the importance of
the constraints imposed by ￿rms in determining workers￿responses to tax policies.
35Because we include only individuals with net deductions larger than DKr 20,000 to estimate bF and bI, there are
too few observations to estimate the values at the 4 digit SIC level.
36Further supporting this result, there is no ￿rm bunching at the statutory middle kink, consistent with the lack of
individual bunching at the middle tax pension kink. Individuals do not search for jobs at the middle kink because
of search costs, and as a result ￿rms do not provide such jobs in equilibrium.
37The di⁄erences in elasticities between men and women may still arise from preference heterogeneity, as ￿rms
in female-dominated occupations may o⁄er more jobs that pay salaries at the kink to cater to their employees￿
preferences.
34IV.D Self-Employed Individuals
The self-employed are a useful comparison group because they face much smaller frictions in adjust-
ing taxable income than wage earners. They are not subject to hours constraints imposed by ￿rms
and do not need to search for a di⁄erent job to change their earnings. They can also easily change
reported taxable incomes, either by shifting realized income across years or by under-reporting
taxable incomes.38 Therefore, we expect that the model￿ s three predictions should not apply to
the self-employed.
Figure 20 replicates the key graphs shown above, restricting attention to the self-employed.
Figure 20a shows that the self-employed exhibit extremely sharp bunching at the top kink, consis-
tent with their ability to adjust their income more easily. The estimated excess mass is b = 18:4 at
the top kink, dwar￿ng the excess mass for wage earners and implying an observed elasticity of 0:23.
Figure 20b shows that unlike wage earners, the self-employed also bunch sharply at the middle tax
kink. The observed elasticity at the middle kink is 0:10. We believe that the observed elasticity at
the middle kink is smaller than that at the top kink because capital income is subject to the middle
tax but not the top tax. Self-employed individuals are allowed to reclassify some of their pro￿ts as
capital income, creating an added margin of response at the top tax cuto⁄. Consistent with this
explanation, self-employed individuals with capital income less than DKr 1,000 in magnitude have
an observed elasticity of 0:15 at the middle kink vs. 0:18 at the top kink.
Figure 20c tests for ￿￿rm bunching￿ by plotting the distribution of self-employment income
around the statutory kink for individuals with deductions larger than DKr 20,000. Unlike wage
earners, self employed individuals with large deductions exhibit no excess mass around the statutory
kink. As a result, self employed individuals with common tax preferences (small deductions) bunch
just as much as those with uncommon tax preferences (large deductions). This is shown in Figure
20d, which is constructed using mean group deductions in the same way as Figure 16.
These ￿placebo tests￿con￿rm that our three predictions do not apply to the self-employed. We
suspect that much of the bunching among the self-employed is not driven by changes in labor supply
but rather by intertemporal shifting and evasion. LeMaire and Schjerning (2007) demonstrate using
the same Danish data that the self-employed adjust their retained earnings and pro￿t distributions
over time to remain below the top tax threshold in each year. Kleven et al. (2009a) uncover
substantial tax evasion among the self-employed and estimate that 40% of the bunching at the
top kink is driven by tax evasion. Regardless of which margin the self employed use, we can
38The Danish tax code allows the self-employed to shift some income across years legally.
35conclude that frictions are a key determinant of observed elasticities: the size and scope of tax
changes matters less for margins of behavior with low frictions (changing reported taxable income
or self-employment earnings) than for margins with higher frictions (changing wage earnings).
V Calibration: A Bound on the Macro Elasticity
What do our estimates of observed elasticities tell us about the structural and macro elasticities?
To answer this question, we bound " using a partial identi￿cation approach. We show that the
observed elasticities from bunching at the middle and top kinks together yield a lower bound on
". The key intuition is that " controls the utility loss of deviating from the optimal level of hours
because it determines the concavity of the utility function (Chetty 2009a). When " is small, the
gains from searching for a level of hours close to h￿
i are very large. Hence, the model cannot
generate very di⁄erent observed elasticities at the middle and top kinks with small " unless search
costs are very large. Therefore, by placing an upper bound on the size of search costs, we obtain
a lower bound on ".
To formalize this logic and obtain an illustrative quantitative bound on ", we impose some
parametric structure on the general model speci￿ed in section II. We assume that the distribution
of job o⁄ers conditional on search and the cost of search e⁄ort e are given by:
h0
i = eh￿
i + (1 ￿ e)e hi (18)
￿i(e) = ￿ ￿ c￿
i ￿ e￿




. With this search technology, an individual draws exactly her optimal hours
level h￿
i with probability e; with probability (1 ￿ e) she draws from a normal distribution centered
at h￿
i with standard deviation ￿. Here, ￿ measures the cost of ￿nding a job with h￿
i hours with
certainty as a percentage of optimal consumption c￿
i, while ￿ controls the elasticity of search costs
with respect to the precision of search. With these functional forms, the structural parameters of
the model are ! = f";￿;￿;￿;F(￿i);FY ;pg. Given !, we compute the equilibrium distribution of
hours G(h) and the amount of bunching implied by the model for a tax system f￿1;￿2;K;￿g using
numerical iteration. Details of the numerical simulation methodology are given in Appendix C.
To bound ", we calibrate the distributional parameters of the model and set identify the re-
maining structural parameters. We begin by normalizing p = w = K
1500, so that individuals who
36work 1500 hours, the median hours in Denmark, reach the kink.39 We calibrate the distribution of
shocks to non-wage income FY using a normal distribution with mean 0 and a standard deviation
of DKr 2;746, which matches the standard deviation of net deductions conditioning on the level of
lagged net deductions in the data. We cannot directly calibrate the search variance parameter ￿
because the search process is unobserved. We therefore estimate the ￿ that best ￿ts the empirical
income distributions for every combination of the remaining parameters consistent with the data.
The smallest ￿ in this set of feasible values is ￿ = 38;000. Since our goal is to obtain a lower bound
on ", we ￿x ￿ = 38;000 because our estimate of " turns out to rise with ￿. We calibrate the taste
distribution F (￿i) using two separate normal distributions whose parameters are chosen to match
the empirical distributions of income away from the top and middle kinks (excluding a DKr 15,000
window around the kinks as in Figure 3) for each potential value of ". Having calibrated these
distributions, we are left with three parameters f";￿;￿g that we set identify using two moments:
observed bunching at the middle and top kinks.
We ￿rst identify " from the observed bunching amounts given a value of ￿. Figure 21a shows
the relationship between the structural elasticity " and the amount of bunching at the top kink b,
holding ￿xed all other parameters. The dashed line in Figure 21a plots the amount of bunching
implied by a frictionless model without uncertainty. In the frictionless model, " has only one e⁄ect
on the amount of bunching: as " increases, the fraction of workers who optimally relocate to the
kink rises, increasing b linearly. However, with frictions, " has a second (countervailing) e⁄ect: a
larger structural elasticity implies that workers have a less concave utility function and gain less
from searching for a job that places them at the kink. To see this point, note that a second-order
Taylor approximation to (2) yields the following expression for the utility loss from working h0
i











where ￿logh = logh0
i ￿logh￿
i. It follows that the utility gain from choosing hours optimally falls
with ". Therefore, fewer workers choose to search for a new job when " is larger, decreasing the
observed amount of bunching at kinks.
The solid lines in Figure 21a plot the relationship between " and the amount of bunching b that
would be observed at the top kink for two values of the search cost, ￿ = 0:07 and ￿ = 0:09. At




is isomorphic to one with price p
0 and disutilities ￿
0
i.
37low elasticities, the amount of bunching increases roughly as in the frictionless case. But at higher
elasticities, the frictions begin to dominate the conventional force, and increases in " reduce the
observed among of bunching. Comparing the two solid lines, we see that as ￿ rises, the e⁄ect of
frictions grows, pulling the curve down more quickly.
The horizontal dashed line at b = 0:81 in Figure 21a marks the empirical estimate of bunching
at the top kink for all wage earners. Because the curves in Figure 21a have an inverted-U shape
when ￿ > 0, there are two values of " consistent with the observed amount of bunching at a kink
conditional on ￿ and ￿. Intuitively, a given observed elasticity can be generated by either a small
structural elasticity and large gains from choosing hours optimally or a large structural elasticity
and small gains from choosing hours optimally.
Next, we show that there is only one combination of " and ￿ (holding ￿xed ￿) that ￿ts the
observed bunching at both the middle and the top kinks. Figure 21b plots the b predicted by
the model at the middle and top kinks in the Danish system given ￿ = 0:07 and ￿ = 1:05. The
empirical estimates of bunching at these two kinks (for the full population of wage earners) are
marked with horizontal lines. To ￿t the data, the curves must each intersect the lines representing
the respective observed elasticity at the same value of ". The two lower crossing values di⁄er
signi￿cantly: " = 0:003 ￿ts the middle kink and " = 0:01 ￿ts the top kink. In contrast, the upper
crossing values are identical: " = 0:24 ￿ts the estimates of b at both kinks with ￿ = 1:05. Only a
relatively large value of " can explain the di⁄erence in observed elasticities between the middle and
top kinks because a small " implies very large gains from search and produces b " = " at both kinks.
There are no values other than " = 0:24 and ￿ = 1:05 that ￿t the data given ￿ = 0:07 in Figure
21b; that is, " and ￿ are point identi￿ed given ￿. To bound ", we must therefore restrict the








The utility loss ￿ increases with ￿ because larger search costs induce more agents to choose hours
further away from their optima. For each value of ￿, there is a single triplet f";￿;￿g that matches
the observed amount of bunching at the two kinks and generates an average utility loss of ￿.
Figure 21c plots the estimated structural elasticity "(￿) vs. the average utility loss ￿. This curve
is downward sloping because the structural elasticity " that ￿ts a given observed elasticity ^ " falls
as ￿ rises, as shown in Figure 21a.
38We consider ￿ = 5% an upper bound on the degree of frictions: individuals are unlikely to
face search costs large enough that they would tolerate a 5% consumption loss every year. With
￿ = 5%, a structural elasticity of " = 0:34 ￿ts the observed bunching at the middle and top kinks
in Denmark. For " < 0:34, there is no combination of parameters that ￿ts the data and generates
￿ < 5%. Although the exact bound of " ￿ 0:34 relies on parametric assumptions, we conclude
that " is an order of magnitude larger than observed elasticities from bunching or tax reforms in
our data.
Figure 21d illustrates why observed elasticities understate the structural elasticity so dramat-
ically in our calibrated model. It plots the equilibrium earnings distribution around the top kink
generated by the model with " = 0:34, ￿ = 1:015, and ￿ = 0:049, the parameters that ￿t the data
at the lower bound. The ￿gure also shows the distribution generated by a frictionless model with
" = 0:34 and ￿ = 0. The simulated excess mass at the kink is an order of magnitude smaller
with frictions because many of those who would optimally locate at the kink are dispersed quite
di⁄usely around the kink. Intuitively, many individuals choose not to pay search costs to ￿nd a
job at the kink because the utility gains from doing so are relatively small. For example, equation
(19) implies that when " = 0:34, the utility loss from ignoring the 30% reduction in the net of
tax wage at the kink and working an extra ￿loghi = 0:3 ￿ 0:34 percent is approximately 1:5% of
consumption.
We calibrated the model to match prediction 1 regarding the e⁄ects of the size of kinks on
observed elasticities. In the calibrated model, we also ￿nd that kinks that a⁄ect a larger fraction
of individuals generate greater bunching and that a larger structural elasticity leads to higher levels
of both individual and ￿rm bunching. Hence, all three predictions that we derived analytically for
special cases of the model in section II hold in the general model for empirically relevant parameters.
Micro vs. Macro Elasticities. The calibrated model can be used to predict how labor supply
di⁄ers in steady state across economies with di⁄erent linear tax rates ￿ and ￿0. We ￿nd that for
￿;￿0 2 (20%;80%), the observed macro elasticity ^ "M =
Eloghi(￿0
1)￿Eloghi(￿1)
log(1￿￿0)￿log(1￿￿) di⁄ers from " by less
than 0:01. Hence, as in the special cases, the structural elasticity itself determines the observed
macro elasticity irrespective of adjustment costs and ￿rm responses. It follows that ^ "M ￿ 0:34
given frictions of ￿ < 5%.
Davis and Henrekson (2005) ￿nd that an intensive-margin elasticity of ^ "M = 0:44 ￿ts the
observed di⁄erences in hours conditional on working across OECD countries with di⁄erent tax
rates. Our calibration results show that such a macro elasticity could be consistent with near-zero
39micro estimates of observed elasticities. Although macro elasticity estimates su⁄er from many
omitted variable and endogeneity problems, we conclude that at least part of the discrepancy
between micro and macro elasticities could be due to adjustment costs and hours constraints.40
VI Conclusion
This paper has shown that the e⁄ects of tax policies on labor supply are shaped by adjustment
costs and hours constraints endogenously chosen by ￿rms. Because of these forces, modern micro-
econometric methods of estimating elasticities ￿focusing on policy changes that a⁄ect a subgroup
of workers ￿may substantially underestimate the ￿structural￿elasticities that control steady-state
behavioral responses. Calibrating a model of labor supply with search costs and hours constraints
to match the empirical evidence, we obtain a lower bound on the macro elasticity of " ￿ 0:34, an
order of magnitude larger than micro estimates for wage earners in our data.
In future work, it would be useful to extend the static analysis here to a dynamic equilibrium
model with frictions. The evidence on salaries tracking the movement in the kink in Figure 17
is one of many potential facts that could be used to develop and test such a model. Workers
should make discrete, lumpy adjustments in hours in response to changes in tax rates, as in an
(S,s) model.41 One could also explore how the dynamics of adjustment vary across ￿rms. Firm
responses should matter more in industries with greater complementarity between workers in their
production technologies. In a dynamic environment with frictions, taxes may also distort other
margins not considered in this paper. Firms may o⁄er a ￿ atter wage pro￿le over the lifecycle to
avoid pushing workers into the highest tax brackets. And workers might change human capital
choices in the long run, further attenuating short run elasticity estimates.
It would also be interesting to explore the normative implications of adjustment costs and ￿rm
responses using the model proposed here. For example, the e¢ ciency cost of a tax levied on one
group of workers may depend not just upon their elasticities but also upon those of their co-workers
if ￿rms are constrained to o⁄er similar packages to di⁄erent workers. Another example concerns
the prediction that it is optimal to levy higher tax rates on men than women because they are less
elastic (Boskin and Sheshinski 1983, Alesina et al. 2007, Kleven et al. 2009b). If the di⁄erence in
40Our analysis also implies an intensive-margin Frisch elasticity above 0:34, as the di⁄erence between Frisch and
Hicksian elasticities is negligible with time separable utility and a non-negative uncompensated wage elasticity (Chetty
2009a).
41Testing this prediction will require hours data. We do not observe clear evidence of lumpy adjustment in the
earnings measures (wihi) studied above, presumably because the wage rate wi changes across periods while hours hi
change infrequently.
40observed elasticities across genders is caused by heterogeneity in occupational frictions rather than
tastes, there may be less justi￿cation for higher taxes on secondary earners in steady state.
Finally, the results here call into question the modern empirical paradigm of using quasi-
experiments that apply to speci￿c subgroups to learn about the e⁄ects of economic policies and
shocks on behavior. In settings with rigid institutional structures and frictions in adjustment, the
steady-state e⁄ects of policies implemented at an economy-wide level could di⁄er substantially from
the e⁄ects of such experiments. Using large, broad policy variation to partially identify a struc-
tural model may be a promising approach to learn about steady-state e⁄ects in many applications
beyond taxation and labor supply.
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44Appendix A: Theoretical Derivations
Predictions 1-3 for Tax Reforms. We introduce a second period in the model to analyze the
e⁄ects of tax reforms. At the beginning of the second period, the government announces an
unexpected tax reform that raises the linear tax rate for workers of type si = L from ￿ to ~ ￿. Let
￿￿ = ~ ￿ ￿ ￿ and ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) = log(1 ￿ ~ ￿) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿).
We model the search process in period 1 exactly as above. Because the tax reform is unantici-
pated, worker and ￿rm behavior in period 1 is the same as in the static model. In period 2, ￿rms
can change the hours they require from workers at no cost and again choose hj to maximize pro￿ts
￿ = phj ￿ w(h)hj. Free entry implies that the equilibrium wage rate is w(h) = w in period 2 as
in period 1. Workers associated with a ￿rm that changes its hours requirement are forced to work
that new level of hours unless they switch jobs. After seeing the full distribution of ￿rm responses
in period 2, workers can pay a search cost ￿i (e) to ￿nd a new job, where the precision of the search
related inversely to e 2 [0;1] as in the static model. Equilibrium in the second period requires
that the aggregate distribution of jobs posted by ￿rms in period 2 coincides with those chosen by
workers who maximize utility net of search costs. A full characterization of dynamics requires
assumptions about the speci￿c ￿rms that move in order to shift the old equilibrium distribution
of jobs to the new equilibrium distribution. The results we derive below rely only on aggregate
dynamics and thus do not require such assumptions.
Let h￿
it denote worker i￿ s optimal labor supply choice in period t and hit her actual choice in
equilibrium. We characterize the observed elasticity from the tax reform ^ "TR =
Eloghi2￿Eloghi1
￿log(1￿￿) in
each of the special cases analyzed in Section II in turn.
Special Case 1. In the frictionless benchmark model, ￿ = 0 for all workers, in which case workers
set h￿
it(￿) = ￿i (w(1 ￿ ￿))
" in both periods. It follows immediately that the observed elasticity
from a tax reform ^ "TR =
Eloghi2￿Eloghi1
￿log(1￿￿) = ".
Special Case 2. In the second special case, ￿i (e) = ￿ is constant and a measure zero set of
workers faces the linear tax schedule (￿ = 1), so the equilibrium distribution of hours G(h) is
unchanged across the two periods. In the second period, a worker￿ s ￿rst-period job hi1 functions
as an initial o⁄er, just as the initial draw h0
i did in the ￿rst period. A worker pays to switch to
his optimal job h￿




, where the thresholds are de￿ned as in equations (7) and (8).
When ￿￿ = 0, the new bounds coincide with the old: hi2 = hi1 and hi2 = hi1. As the size of the






@￿￿ < 0 and @hi2
@￿￿ < 0. Therefore the
45fraction of workers paying to search increases. Average labor supply for those with si = L in the














+ G(hi1) is the fraction of workers that switch jobs after the reform.
As the size of the tax reform grows large, the observed elasticity converges to ": lim￿￿!1^ "TR =
". Intuitively, for a su¢ ciently large tax reform, hi2 ￿ hi1, in which case all workers pay to search
(qi2 = 1) and set hi2 = h￿
i2. Although workers do not all have hi1 = h￿
i1, the change in average
hours grows large relative to hi1￿h￿
i1 as ￿￿ ! 1, and thus ^ "TR ! ". While ^ "TR always converges
to ", the derivative @^ "TR
@￿￿ can only be signed by making assumptions about the job o⁄er distribution
G(h). Suppose that the distribution of preferences are such that the equilibrium distribution of jobs
G(h) is uniform for those with si = NL, who do not face the tax reform. Under this assumption,
the fraction of workers who reoptimize following the tax change qi2 increases monotonically from 0
to 1 as the size of the reform increases and hence @^ "TR
@￿￿ > 0.
Combining these results yields a prediction for tax reforms analogous to Prediction 1.
Prediction A1: When workers face search costs,
(a) the observed elasticity from tax reforms converges to " as the size of the tax change grows:
lim
￿log(1￿￿)!1
^ "TR = "
(b) If the o⁄er distribution G(h) is uniform, ^ " rises with ￿￿:
@^ "TR=@ ln(1 ￿ ￿) > 0
Special Case 3. In the third special case, ￿i(e) = 0 for a fraction ￿ of workers and ￿i(e) = 1 for
the rest, and ￿ 2 (0;1). In both periods, the equilibrium distribution of hours G(h(￿)) = G￿(h(￿)),
the optimal distribution of hours, following the same logic as in the text. Let ￿logh￿
L = "￿(log(1￿
~ ￿)￿log(1￿￿)) denote the optimal change in hours for those facing the linear tax. The actual change
in hours for this group is ￿loghL = (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))￿logh￿
L. The ￿rst term in this expression
is the individual response (the analog of individual bunching), ￿loghI = ￿￿logh￿
L. The second
term is the ￿rm response (the analog of ￿rm bunching), ￿loghF = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿logh￿
L.
46The change in hours for those with si = NL is ￿loghNL = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿logh￿
L = ￿loghF,




= (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))"
the analogs of predictions 2 and 3 follow immediately.
Prediction A2: Search costs interact with hours constraints to generate ￿rm responses to tax
reforms. The size of the ￿rm response and observed elasticity rises with the fraction of workers
who face a tax reform:
￿loghF = ￿loghNL > 0 i⁄ ￿ < 1
@￿loghF
@ (1 ￿ ￿)
> 0,
@^ "TR
@ (1 ￿ ￿)
> 0:











Non-Constant Structural Elasticities. Suppose agents have quasi-linear utilities of the form
ui (c;h) = c￿ 1
￿i (h). This utility permits the structural elasticity of labor supply " = @ lnh￿
@ ln((1￿￿1)w)
to vary arbitrarily with the net-of-tax rate depending upon  00(h). In the frictionless model, workers
who face an increase in their marginal tax rates from ￿1 to ￿2 at an earnings level of K bunch at the
kink i⁄ ￿i 2 [￿(￿1);￿(￿2)], where ￿(￿1) =  0(hK)=((1 ￿ ￿1)w) and ￿(￿2) =  0(hK)=((1 ￿ ￿2)w).
The amount of bunching at the kink is therefore B￿(￿1;￿2) =
R ￿(￿2)
￿(￿1) dF(￿i). It follows that for
any tax rates ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3, the amount of bunching created from two smaller kinks is exactly equal
to the bunching created at one larger kink:
B￿ (￿1;￿3) = B￿ (￿1;￿2) + B￿ (￿2;￿3)
Now consider special case 2 of the model with frictions, where agents pay a ￿xed cost ￿ to search.
Here, the amount of bunching is




47where the fraction of workers who pay the search cost to locate at the kink (￿) increases with the
change in tax rates at the kink (￿2 ￿ ￿1). Therefore the model with frictions instead implies that
bunching at one large kink is greater than the sum of bunching at two smaller kinks:
B (￿1;￿3) > B (￿1;￿2) + B (￿2;￿3).
Appendix B: Data
We merge selected variables from the following registers available at the Center for Applied Mi-
croeconometrics at University of Copenhagen through Statistics Denmark: a) the Income Statistics
Register, which covers everyone who is tax liable in Denmark, b) the Population Register, which
covers the entire population on December 31st of a given year and provides basic demographic
information such as age and gender, and c) the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research
(IDA), which contains information on labor market experience, occupation, employment status,
education, family status, etc. For every gender-age cell of the individuals between the ages of 16
and 70, we have tax records for between 99.96 and 100% of the population. We do not have tax
records for people over 70 years of age, and 83% of 15 year olds have records in the tax register.
Statistics Denmark￿ s Employment Classi￿cation Module combines several administrative records
to assign every observation in the IDA database one of eight employment codes, contained in the
variable beskst (employment status). The employment status code distinguishes individuals who
are wage earners, wage earners with unemployment income, wage earners with self employment
income, and ￿ve categories of non-wage earners (self-employed, pensioners, etc.). To form our
primary analysis dataset, we keep only individuals with beskst=4, thereby excluding all non wage
earners, wage earners with self employment income, and wage earners with unemployment. Broad-
ening this de￿nition to include all non-self employment categories (beskst=4,5,7, or 8) does not a⁄ect
the results; for instance, we ￿nd excess mass at the top kink of b = 0:83 in the broader sample
compared with b = 0:81 for the narrower sample used in Figure 3.
To calculate marginal tax rates and income relative to the tax bracket cuto⁄s, we develop a tax
simulator for Denmark analogous to NBER TAXSIM. Denmark has essentially an individual tax
system, but there are some joint aspects, so the tax simulator uses as inputs both income related
to the social security number associated with a given tax record (pnr) as well as that of the spouse
for tax purposes (henv). The municipality of residence in the previous year (glskkmnr) is used
48to determine what tax rates the individual faces. For the tax payer and his or her spouse, the
variables used in the tax simulator are primarily the personal exemption (pfrdst, berfrdst), personal
income (perindkp, berpi), capital income (kapindkp, berkap), special deductions (lignfrdp). We also
make use of some other more disaggregated variables in the tax records to account for transitional
schemes and special adjustments to the tax bases. These include deductions in personal income for
individual contributions to pension schemes (kappens, fosfufrd), employer contributions to capital
pension schemes (arbpen14, arbpen15), and alimony paid (underhol).
We assess the accuracy of the tax calculator using data from the tax register on the exact
amount of municipal, regional, bottom, middle and top tax paid by each individual. Our tax
calculator is correct to within +/- 5DKr ($1) of the actual amount paid for all of these taxes for
95% of the observations in the data. It is accurate to within +/-1,000DKr ($167) for 98% of the
observations. The discrepancies arise from our inability to fully model complex capital income
transfer rules that apply to some spouses as well as unusual circumstances such as individuals who
die during the year or those working both in Denmark and abroad who are subject to special tax
treaties. Since we do not have tax records for people aged less than 15 or more than 70, we also
cannot fully account for the joint aspects of the tax system for people with spouses aged less than
15 or over 70.
In addition to the variables described above used to compute taxable income and pension
contributions, we also use the following source variables in our empirical analysis: wage earnings
(qlontmp2), self-employment pro￿ts and retained earnings (qovskvir, virkordind), labor market
experience (erhver, erhver79), and occupational code (discok). We de￿ne an individual￿ s net
deductions in the top tax base as the level of wage earnings he/she would need to start paying
the top tax minus the statutory top tax cuto⁄ (i.e. the level of total personal income at which
individuals must start paying the top tax).
The STATA code and tax simulator are available from the authors and have been posted on
the servers at the Center for Applied Microeconometrics.
Appendix C: Calibration Methodology
This appendix describes how we simulate the general model and bound " to match the empirical
estimates.
Numerical Simulation. Given a vector of structural parameters ! = f";￿;￿;￿;p;F(￿i);FY g
and a tax system f￿1;￿2;K;￿g, we numerically simulate the equilibrium hours distribution and the
49amount of bunching in the general model using iteration. We discretize the hours distribution G(h)
so that the distribution of earnings is evenly spaced in 500 DKr steps. Let gj denote the fraction of
agents who work hours hj in the equilibrium de￿ned in section II and g￿
j denote the unconstrained
optimal distribution of hours choices in the frictionless model. We similarly discretize the taste
distribution F(￿i). Let Pi denote the fraction of agents with disutility ￿i.
We ￿rst solve for the worker￿ s optimal hours choice h￿
i by numerically integrating over the
distribution of unearned income FY (yi) to calculate each agent￿ s expected utility. We then start
from an initial o⁄er distribution that matches the frictionless optimum g0
j = g￿
j and compute the
distribution of jobs chosen by workers after the search process (again using numerical integration
over FY ). We label the resulting distribution g1









< 10￿20. Finally, we add the distribution of non-wage
income FY to the equilibrium earnings distribution to calculate the equilibrium distribution of
taxable income. We verify that the equilibrium distribution gj is unique by varying the initial
distribution g0
j. Finally, we use the method in section II.B to calculate the amount of bunching at
the kink (b) and apply equation (6) to recover the observed elasticity implied by this value of b.
Calibration. We specify the tax system parameters using the values for the year 2000, shown
in Figure 2a. The top tax parameters are f￿1 = 0:55, ￿2 = 0:68, K = 267;600, ￿ = 0:6g and
the middle tax as f￿1 = 0:49, ￿2 = 0:55, K = 164;300, ￿ = 0:4g. Given each value of ", we
￿rst estimate the parameters f￿;￿;￿;F(￿i)g by minimizing the sum of squared errors between the
simulated and empirical distributions of taxable income around the two kinks. We then ￿x the
standard deviation at the lowest value of ￿ that ￿ts the data for any value of ":
￿ = min￿￿ (") s.t. bT = c bT; bM = c bM.
Holding ￿xed ￿ at this lower bound, we ￿nd the values of ￿ and ￿ that generate simulated amounts
of bunching equal to the empirical estimates of b for all wage earners, re-estimating the best ￿t
F (￿i) distribution for each ". This procedure ensures that the lower bound on " is identi￿ed
solely from the amount of bunching at the two kinks. Finally, we calculate the ￿ implied by the
parameters associated with each value of " by calculating the average value of u(h￿
i) ￿ u(hi) for




Wage Earners < 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics:
Age 40.91 39.17 41.43 46.02
Children 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.70
Labor market experience (years) 12.46 15.42 18.77 9.46
College education 17.61% 22.76% 28.54% 17.74%
Female 49.61% 48.17% 39.17% 24.40%
Married 50.62% 53.64% 58.68% 67.34%
Income:
Wage earnings 149,254 236,478 269,340 38,343
Other personal income 42,642 9,408 2,747 153,467
Total personal Income 180,213 227,359 251,145 188,854
Net capital income -10,672 -15,819 -19,570 -7,785
Deductions:
Net deductions -40,687 -13,151 -6,381 -31,996
|Net deductions|<7,500 43.25% 59.36% 69.11% 23.84%
|Net deductions-Pension kink|<7,500 2.03% 2.72% 2.96% 5.07%
Individual pension contributions 4,316 4,217 4,535 16,709
Employer pension contributions 7,584 12,065 13,131 2,123
Tax Payments:
Predicted liability accurate within 5 DKr 95.11% 94.83% 94.47% 93.62%
Pays the middle tax 50.38% 74.23% 95.57% 45.48%
Pays the top tax 18.06% 25.87% 33.53% 23.61%
2-year growth in net-of-tax rate (NTR) 1.68% 2.25% 2.25% 1.07%
Std dev of 2-year growth in NTR 4.50% 4.95% 4.95% 6.80%
Number of observations 30,492,819 17,866,090 6,788,235 1,846,064
NOTE--Table entries are means unless otherwise noted. Column 1 is based on the full population of 
Denmark between ages 15-70 from 1994-2001.  Column 2 includes all wage earners, the primary 
estimation sample. Column 3 includes only the subset of wage earners for whom |taxable income - top tax 
cutoff| < 50,000, i.e. the individuals in Figure 3.  Column 4 considers individuals who report positive self-
employment income.  All monetary values are in real 2000 Danish Kroner.  Children are the number of 
children younger than 18 living with the individual.  Personal income refers to all non-capital income.  Net 
capital income refers to capital income minus payments such as mortgage interest.  Net deductions refer 
to deductions from the top tax base such as individual pension contributions minus non-wage income such 
as taxable gifts.  Net of tax rate is one minus the marginal tax rate predicted by our tax simulator.
Summary Statistics for the Danish Population and Estimation Samples, 1994-2001
TABLE 1Dependent Variable: Log Change in Wage Earnings
Subgroup: All Wage Earners Married High-Experience Wage Married
Baseline Full Controls Females Married Female Earners Females 
Professionals > 200K > 200K
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log change in net-of-tax -0.005 -0.007 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.013
   rate ( log (1-t)) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006)
Labor income spline x x x x x x
Personal income spline x x x x x
Year fixed effects x x x x x x
Age fixed effects x x x x x x
Region fixed effects x
Occupation fixed effects x
Capital income spline x
Gender, Marital status x
Observations 11,512,625 8,189,920 3,136,894 156,527 7,480,900 1,767,737
TABLE 2
Observed Elasticity Estimates using Small Tax Reforms
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual reported in parentheses. Dependent variable in all specifications is
nominal two-year growth rate in wage earnings. Independent variable of interest is two-year growth rate in net-of-
tax rate, instrumented using two-year growth rate in simulated net-of-tax rate using base-year variables.
Coefficients reported can be interpreted as observed wage earnings elasticities from tax reforms. All
specifications include 10-piece wage earnings and total personal income splines as well as age and year fixed
effects. Column 2 also includes a 10 piece capital income spline, gender and marital status indicators, and
region and occupation fixed effects. Occupation fixed effects are available only for a subset of years and
observations. Column 4 restricts attention to married female professionals with more than 19 years of labor
market experience. Columns 5 and 6 restrict attention to individuals with more than DKr 200,000 of wage
earnings in the base year.FIGURE 1























U(c,h) = U* – φ
_
h’
Slope = (1 – 2)w
Slope =
Slope = (1 – ’)w
(1 – 1)w
Notes: This figure illustrates how search costs affect bunching at kinks. The two-bracket tax system creates the kinked
budget set shown in red. The worker’s indifference curves are shown by the blue isoquants. This worker’s optimal labor
supply is to set h∗ hK, placing her at the kink. The lower indifference curve shows the optimal utility minus the search
cost . If the worker draws an initial hours offer between h and h, she will not pay  to relocate to the kink. As the tax
change at the bracket cutoff increases in magnitude (shown by the green dashed line), the inaction region shrinks to h,h
′,
leading to a larger observed elasticity from bunching.FIGURE 2
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(a) Marginal Tax Rates in Denmark in 2000
log(NTR) = -11%
log(NTR) = -33%
Note: $1  6 DKr







































































1994 1996 1998 2000 1995 1997 1999 2001
Notes: Panel (a) plots the marginal tax rate in 2000 vs. income in Denmark, including the national tax, regional tax, and
average municipal tax. Panel (b) plots the level of taxable income above which earners must pay the top bracket national
tax. The series in blue diamonds, plotted on the right y-axis, shows the nominal cutoff; the series in red squares, plotted on
the left y-axis, shows the cutoff in real 2000 DKr.FIGURE 3
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Excess mass (b) = 0.81 
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Excess mass (b) = 0.81 
Standard error = 0.05 
Notes: This figure shows the taxable income distribution around the top tax bracket cutoff (demarcated by the vertical red
line at 0) for wage earners between 1994-2001. The series with dots plots a histogram of taxable income (as defined for
the top tax base), relative to the top tax cutoff in the relevant year. Each point shows the number of observations in a DKr
1,000 bin. The solid line beneath the empirical distribution is a seventh-degree polynomial fitted to the empirical
distribution excluding the points DKr 7,500 or fewer from the cutoff, as in equation (15). The shaded region is the
estimated excess mass at the top bracket cutoff, which is 81% of the average height of the counterfactual distribution
beneath.FIGURE 4
















































































(a) Married Women vs. Single Men
Taxable Income Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr)
Married Women
Excess mass (b)= 1.79
Standard error = 0.10
Single Men
Excess mass (b) = 0.25
















































































(a) Married Women vs. Single Men
Taxable Income Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr)
Married Women
Excess mass (b)= 1.79
Standard error = 0.10
Single Men
Excess mass (b) = 0.25
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Taxable Income Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr)
Teachers
Excess mass (b)= 3.54
Standard error = 0.25
Military
Excess mass (b) = -0.12
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Taxable Income Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr)
Teachers
Excess mass (b)= 3.54
Standard error = 0.25
Military
Excess mass (b) = -0.12
Standard error = 0.21
Notes: These figures plot the empirical distributions of taxable income, replicating Figure 3, for four subgroups of the
population. Figure (a) considers married women and single men. Figure (b) considers school teachers (ISCO 2331) and
the military (ISCO 1013).FIGURE 5






























































































210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300
Taxable Income (1000s DKR)
All Wage Earners
Excess Mass (b) = 0.61
Standard error = 0.08
(a) 1994
Married Women
Excess Mass (b) = 1.03






























































































210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300
Taxable Income (1000s DKR)
All Wage Earners
Excess Mass (b) = 0.61
Standard error = 0.08
(a) 1994
Married Women
Excess Mass (b) = 1.03
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(b) 1995
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(b) 1995
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(c) 1996
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(c) 1996
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(e) 1998
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(e) 1998
























































































210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300
(f) 1999
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(f) 1999
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Notes: These figures plot the empirical distribution of taxable income for wage earners and married female wage earners in
each year from 1994-2001. In all panels, the upper distribution is for married women and the lower distribution is for all
wage earners. The solid vertical lines mark the top tax bracket cutoff (in nominal DKr) in each year. The figure also
shows the counterfactual distributions and excess masses, computed as in Figure 3.FIGURE 6




































































































































































































































































1997 Cutoff, Adjusted 
for Wage Growth






















































































1997 Cutoff, Adjusted 
for Wage Growth
All wage earners Married women All wage earners Married women
Notes: Panel (a) replicates the income distribution in Figure 5d, zooming in around the top tax bracket cutoff. The location
of the bracket cutoff in 1997 is marked with the solid line. The dashed green line shows the level of the 1994 top bracket
cutoff adjusted for inflation. The dashed blue line shows the 1994 bracket adjusted for average wage growth. Panel (b)
replicates (a) for the year 2001: the dashed vertical lines reflect the 1997 bracket cutoff adjusted for inflation and average
wage growth.FIGURE 7
Distributions of Wage Earnings and Broad Income































Income Measure Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKR)
Taxable income + pension contribs.
Excess mass (b)= 0.48
Standard error = 0.04
Wage earnings
Excess mass (b) = 0.68
Standard error = 0.05































Income Measure Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKR)
Taxable income + pension contribs.
Excess mass (b)= 0.48
Standard error = 0.04
Wage earnings
Excess mass (b) = 0.68
Standard error = 0.05
Notes: These figures plot the empirical distribution of wage earnings and broad income around the statutory top tax cutoff
(which applies to individuals with 0 net deductions) for the population of wage earners. Broad income is defined as
taxable income plus contributions to tax-deductible pension accounts. The figure also shows the counterfactual
distributions and excess masses, computed as in Figure 3.FIGURE 8
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(a) All Wage Earners: Taxable Income Distribution
Excess mass (b) = 0.06
Standard error = 0.03
Predicted excess mass = 0.16
Standard error = 0.01
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(a) All Wage Earners: Taxable Income Distribution
Excess mass (b) = 0.06
Standard error = 0.03
Predicted excess mass = 0.16
Standard error = 0.01
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(b) All Wage Earners: Wage Earnings Distribution










Excess mass (b) = -0.06
Standard error = 0.03
Predicted excess mass = 0.14 
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(b) All Wage Earners: Wage Earnings Distribution










Excess mass (b) = -0.06
Standard error = 0.03
Predicted excess mass = 0.14 
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(c) Married Women: Taxable Income Distribution










Excess mass (b) = 0.06
Standard error = 0.03
Predicted excess mass = 0.35
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(c) Married Women: Taxable Income Distribution










Excess mass (b) = 0.06
Standard error = 0.03
Predicted excess mass = 0.35
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(d) Married Women: Wage Earnings Distribution










Excess mass (b) =-0.02
Standard error = 0.03
Predicted excess mass = 0.31
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(d) Married Women: Wage Earnings Distribution










Excess mass (b) =-0.02
Standard error = 0.03
Predicted excess mass = 0.31
Standard error = 0.02
Notes: These figures plot the empirical distributions of taxable income and wage earnings around the middle tax cutoff,
where net-of-tax wage rates fall by 11% on average. The figures also show counterfactual distributions and excess masses,
computed as in Figure 3. Panel (a) plots the distribution of taxable income (as defined for the middle tax base). Panel (b)
plots the distribution of wage earnings, the same variable used in Figure 7. Panels (c) and (d) replicate (a) and (b) for the
subgroup of married female wage earners. In each panel, we also report the amount of bunching predicted if the elasticity
were the same as that estimated from the amount of bunching at the top bracket cutoff for the corresponding income
measure and subgroup.FIGURE 9
Observed Elasticities vs. Size of Tax Changes



























Notes: This figure plots observed elasticities for all wage earners vs. the percent (log) change in the net-of-tax rate used to
estimate that elasticity. The blue best-fit line is estimated using OLS. The five points correspond to estimates from small
tax reforms (Column 1 of Table 2) and bunching at the middle tax cutoff from 1994-1996 (Δlog1 −   9.5%), the
middle tax cutoff from 1997-2001 (Δlog1 −   11.6%), the top tax cutoff in 1994, 1997, and 1998
(Δlog1 −   29.7%), and the top tax cutoff in 1995-1996 and 1999-2001 (Δlog1 −   32.1%). The elasticities
corresponding to bunching at kinks are calculated using estimates of b as reported in Figure 3 and the formula for the
frictionless model in (6).FIGURE 10
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Excess mass (b) = 0.54
Standard error = 0.08
Excess mass (b) = 0.06
Standard error = 0.07
Middle Tax, year t+2
Top Tax, year t
Notes: This figure restricts attention to wage earners who earned within DKr 50,000 of the top tax bracket cutoff in a given
year t and within DKr 50,000 of the middle tax bracket cutoff in year t  2. For this fixed group of individuals, we plot the
empirical distribution of taxable income in year t around the top bracket cutoff and the distribution of taxable income
around the middle tax cutoff in year t  2. The figure also shows the counterfactual distributions and excess masses,
computed as in Figure 3.FIGURE 11
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of perceived middle and top tax cutoffs from an internet survey of 3,299 members
of a union representing public and financial sector employees. Individuals were asked to report the income levels at which
they would have to begin paying the middle and top taxes in the 2008 Danish tax code. The figure shows a histogram of
the responses for the top tax (solid red line) and middle tax (dashed blue line) cutoffs using bins of DKr 30,000 in width.
The bins are centered on the true cutoffs, so that the mode of each distribution represents the fraction of people whose
perception of the tax bracket cutoff was within DKr 15,000 of the correct value..FIGURE 12
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(b) Conditional Distribution Given Deductions > DKr 20,000
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(b) Conditional Distribution Given Deductions > DKr 20,000











Notes: Panel (a) plots a histogram of net deductions, defined as deductions minus non-wage income relevant for the top tax
base. Figure (b) plots a histogram of net deductions between DKr 20,000 and DKr 50,000. To identify bunching in
deductions at the pension kink, in Panel B we recenter deductions in each year so that the pension contribution limit in that
year equals the average pension contribution limit across the years (DKr 33,000).FIGURE 13
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(b) Teachers with Deductions > DKr 20,000
Notes: These two figures plot the empirical distribution of wage earnings around the statutory top tax cutoff in 1994-2001
for (a) all teachers (ISCO 2331) and (b) teachers with net deductions greater than DKr 20,000.FIGURE 14



















Modes of Wage Earnings Distributions Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr) 
Notes: To construct this figure, we calculate the mode of the wage earnings distribution in each occupation-year cell,
defined as the DKr 5,000 bin with the most individuals in that occupation-year. Occupations are defined by 4 digit ISCO
codes. The figure shows a histogram of these modes, excluding occupations with fewer than 7000 workers.FIGURE 15
Individual vs. Firm Bunching at the Pension Kink
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Excess mass (b) = 0.70
Standard error = 0.20




































-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Excess mass (b) = 0.70
Standard error = 0.20




























-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Excess mass (b)= -0.01
Standard error = 0.15




























-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
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Excess mass (b)= 0.56
Standard error = 0.10
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Excess mass (b)= 0.56
Standard error = 0.10
Notes: Panel (a) plots the distribution of wage earnings relative to the pension kink (demarcated by the green vertical line)
for wage earners with greater than DKr 20,000 of net deductions. The pension kink is defined as the top tax bracket cutoff
plus the maximum tax-deductible pension contribution in each year. Panel (b) replicates (a) for wage earners with between
DKr 7,500 and DKr 25,000 of net deductions. Panel (c) plots the distribution of wage earnings relative to the statutory top
kink (demarcated by the red vertical line) for wage earners with between DKr 7,500 and DKr 25,000 in net deductions.
The figure also shows the counterfactual distributions and excess masses, computed as in Figure 3.FIGURE 16
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Notes: To construct this figure, we first calculate the fraction of individuals with net deductions less than DKr 7,500 in
magnitude in each age-gender-marital status-year cell. We then group individuals into 10 equal-width bins based on the
fraction with small deductions in their group as described in the text. We estimate the excess mass at the top kink as in
Figure 3 and apply equation (6) to calculate observed elasticities for each of the ten groups. The figure shows a scatter plot
of the observed elasticities vs. the fraction with small deductions in the 10 bins. The blue best-fit line is estimated using
OLS.FIGURE 17























































Wage Earnings Relative to Statutory Kink (1000s DKR)
































































Wage Earnings Relative to Statutory Kink (1000s DKR)



























































Wage Earnings Relative to Pension Kink (1000s DKR)
(b) Wage Earners around Pension Kink: Deductions > 20,000
Notes: These figures show how the propensity to track the movement in the top tax cutoff across years varies across
individuals. To construct Panel (a), we first divide individuals into bins of DKr 1000 in wage earnings in a given year t,
and calculate the fraction in each bin whose change in wage earnings from a year t to t  2 falls within DKr 7,500 of the
movement in the top tax bracket cutoff from year t to t  2. Panel A plots this fraction for wage earnings bins around the
statutory top tax cutoff. Panel (b) replicates (a) for the pension kink, restricting the sample to wage earners with net
deductions greater than DKr 20,000.. It shows the fraction of individuals whose change in wage earnings falls within DKr
7,500 of the movement in the pension kink for wage earnings bins around the pension kink.FIGURE 18
























































































































Individual Bunching at Pension Kink
ISCO Code Occupation Description No. of Workers
1 Military 24,557
11 Legislators and senior officials 5,918
12 Corporate managers 54,154
13 General managers 3,238
21 Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals 42,645
22 Life science and health professionals 30,058
23 Teaching professionals 106,735
24 Other professionals 72,240
31 Physical and engineering science associate professionals 68,803
32 Life science and health associate professionals 73,960
33 Teaching associate professionals 77,032
34 Other associate professionals 147,951
41 Office clerks 237,735
42 Customer service clerks 32,853
51 Personal and protective service workers 228,658
52 Models, sales persons, and demonstrators 74,005
61 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 14,198
71 Exaction and related trades workers 95,359
72 Metal, machinery and related trades workers 110,937
73 Precision, handicraft, printing and related trades workers 11,786
74 Other craft and related trades workers 20,086
81 Stationary plant and related operators 10,968
82 Machine operators and assemblers 106,556
83 Drivers and mobile plant operators 36,318
91 Sales and services elementary occupations 99,551
92 Agricultural, fishery and related labourers 9,431
93 Mining, construction, manufacturing, and transport 75,516
Notes: This figure plots the amount of firm bunching vs. the amount of individual bunching for all International Standard
Classification of Occupation codes at the two digit level. Both firm and individual bunching are estimated on the subgroup
of individuals with net deductions greater than DKr 20,000, as in Figure 15a. Individual bunching is the excess mass at the
pension kink for this group, while firm bunching is the excess mass at the statutory top tax cutoff for the same group.FIGURE 19


























-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50











Taxable Income Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr)
Excess mass (b)= 1.37
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Taxable Income Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr)
Excess mass (b)= 1.37



















































Taxable Income Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr)
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DFL Reweighted
Excess mass (b)= 0.85
Standard error = 0.09 Unweighted
Excess mass (b)= 0.46



















































Taxable Income Relative to Top Bracket Cutoff (1000s DKr)
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DFL Reweighted
Excess mass (b)= 0.85
Standard error = 0.09 Unweighted
Excess mass (b)= 0.46
Standard error = 0.03
Notes: These figures plot the empirical distributions of taxable income around the top tax cutoff for (a) female wage
earners and (b) male wage earners. The series in grey squares in Panel B shows the raw distribution of taxable income for
men. The series in blue circles shows reweights the observations for men to match the occupational distribution of women
(defined by 4 digit ISCO codes). Following DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), we reweight an observation in
occupation i by
pi
1−pi ,w h e r epi is the probability that a wage earner in occupation i is female. The figure also shows the
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Excess mass (b) = 18.42











(a) Taxable Income Distribution around Top Tax Cutoff
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Excess mass (b) = 18.42











(a) Taxable Income Distribution around Top Tax Cutoff
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Excess mass (b)= 1.44











(b) Taxable Income Distribution around Middle Tax Cutoff
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Excess mass (b)= 1.44











(b) Taxable Income Distribution around Middle Tax Cutoff
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Excess mass (b)= 0.22
Standard error = 0.47
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Excess mass (b)= 0.22
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(d) Observed Elasticities vs. Scope of Tax Changes



























































(d) Observed Elasticities vs. Scope of Tax Changes
Fraction of Group with |Net Deductions| < 7500
Notes: These figures include only individuals who report positive self-employment income. Panels (a) and (b) plot the
taxable income distribution around the top and middle cutoffs from 1994-2001. Panel (c) plots the distribution of realized
self-employment income around the statutory top tax cutoff for individuals with net deductions greater than 20,000. Panel
(d) replicates Figure 16 for individuals with positive self-employment income, with the y axis scaled to have the same
range relative to the mean observed elasticity as in Figure 16.FIGURE 21
Calibration of Model and Bound on Structural Elasticity
(a) Effect of Search Costs on Excess Mass at the Top Kink
Structural Elasticity ()
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(c) Structural Elasticity vs. Degree of Frictions




































(d) Simulated Income Distributions Around the Top Kink
No frictions With frictions
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Notes: This figure shows how we calibrate the model to match the empirically estimates of bunching at the top and middle
kinks. Panel (a) plots the simulated relationship between the structural elasticity  and the observed bunching at the top
kink for two values of the search cost:   0.07, and   0.09. Panel (b) plots the simulated amount of bunching at the
top and middle kinks vs.  for the   0.07 case. The horizontal lines show the empirically observed amount of bunching
at the two kinks. Panel (c) shows the value of  that fits the data for each value of , the average utility loss from failing to
choose optimal hours measured as a fraction of optimal consumption. Panel (d) displays the simulated equilibrium taxable
income distributions without frictions (  0) and with frictions (  0.049,   1.015) when   0.34. See Appendix C
for details of the numerical methods used to generate these figures.